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Yenshö Kanakura
subdivisions as to avagraha, ie, avagraha of bahu, al pa, bahu-vidha, eka-vidha. kşi pra, cirena, nisrita, anisrita, anukta, ukta, dhruva and adhruva, The same twelve cases are set up as to the rest of three processes, i, e. thā, apave and dharanā, so the total amounts to forty-eight instances.
On what criteria, then, these forty-eight categorical items were posited ? The four mental processes above are not those derived by discussing the peculiar functions of the respective sense organs, but are those derived by analysing the congnitive process common to the six senses, i.e.. five indriyas and manas. In that case, these forty-eight items should be naturally regarded as the categories common to the six senses. Otherwise. the visual sense can theoretically have other categories like the apprehension of red colour, so on and so forth up to innumerable categories, which can hardly be confined within forty-eight kinds. So these have to be the categories sbared by the six senses. However, when we reexamine these forty-eight categories whether or not they are sufficiently convincing to us. unfortunately we have to admit that there are some which are difficult to be fully convincing. For instance, how the concept such as kşi pra was considered to be apprehended and judged by the tongue of which province is taste ? From the empirical ground of the contrasting idea such as slowly sweet and quickly bitter, it must have probaly been thought to be applicable to taste also, In that case, the antithetical idea of strong cum weak must be also added to the above forty-eight kinds for the same reason. Thus this enumeration of forty-eight items does not necessarily mean the dete rmitate number.
The next sūtra, arthasya (17)', is briefly commented upon by Umāsvāti, "avagrahadayo matijnana-vikalpa arthasya bhavanti'. At a glance artha seems stand in parallel with the twelve categories of the previous sūtra. It should not be so taken, of course, from the commentary on the sūtra 12 and from the logical context also, but should be understood in the sense, with regard to the object' or 'with regard to the distinct object' which stands against the indistinct object of the next sutra. Now taking it in the sense of with regard to the object', the world artha must refer to both sūtras 15 and 16 as the nominative case governing all these subdivisions. In another word, it is understood to attain the formulae of such proposition as, “It appre. hends the object as many," "It ascertains the object as quick," etc. Jacobi notes that this term artha denotes drayya in the Sarvārthasiddhi of Pajyapāda. Now, the word dravya is employed in the T. s, in the following sätras, i. e., 'nāmasthāpana-drayya-bhavatas-tan-nyusah (1:5)', 'mati-śrutayornibandhah sarva-drayyeşu-asarva-paryayeșu (1:27)', sarva-dravya-paryāyeşu keva. lasya (1:33)', 'dravyāni jivas.ca (v:5); 'guna-paryayavad-drajyam which extends to the succeeding sütras, kalas-cely-eke (V:38)' and 'drayyaśraya
(V:37) nirgunā gunah (V:40)'. Dravya is consideredered there as the substance upon which qualities and modes depend, which sums up at the same time the
