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A Study of the Jaina Theory of Knowledge-on Matijñana
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does not signify a mere judgement or ascertainment of an idea, but denotes valuation of good cum bad and right cum wrong, which is performed upon the ground of the former. And this simple judgment or determination of a concept should rather be regarded as the province of iha of the 2nd stage, which is defined as niscaya-vīșeșa-jijñāsa' The explanation given by Jacobi and Jaini which is based on that of the commentators in tradition cannot certainly be criticized as incorrect as a whole. Rather it is thought to be proper to follw them as the traditional understanding of the Jainas. I also gave a conventional explanation in the note to the sūtra 15 in the previous chapter of the Japanese translation What I am proposing here is that the sūtra should be comprehended as above if it is understood in accord. ance with the Syo pajñabhāsya. The word apāya primarily sigoifies to leave off', of which original sense cannot be sufficiently expressed by the word judgment. As the synonyms listed suggest, the sense of adoption and option is. it should not be forgotten, implied in it.
Furthermore, the Bhāşya describes as if both operations of iha and a pāya immediately succeed avagraha, somehow occurring synchronically. Most probably this impression was created by the indiscreet description of the author, and the fact maintaioed by him ought to be considered that avagraha is succeeded by iha, which is then succeeded by a pāya. Lastly, the fourth stage of dharana is commented upon to mean the understand ing of the respective object, retention of and ascertainment of matijñāna, Pratipatti, avadharana, avasthana, niscaya, avagama and avabodha are reckoned as its equivalents. What strikes us here is that the word avadharana which was listed as a synonym of ayagraha again appears here as an equ. ivalent of dharanä. It is difficult to say if this redundancy is due to the mere inattentiveness of the author or to a scribal error. Or it is not necessarily impossible to understand its meaning, if the former is taken in the sense of bare ascertainment of the apprehended object and the latter of its establishment. Jacobi takes dharaṇā in the sense of recognition that the object is the same crane that I saw yesterday. He also notes the existence of another explanation that it denotes a memory which brings one to recognize the object, but not recognition itself. Nevertheless, Umāsväti means it in his commentary to bold an image of the ascertained object in mind, in another word, he means it as an operation of impressing object in mind and remembering it.
The text proceeds further to say that by the above four kinds of mati. jnana is attained the cognition of bahu-bahuvidha-kşi pranisritunukta-dhruv. anam setarunām (16)' and 'arthasya (17)'. According to the Bhasya, four divisions of mati apply each to bahu etc, as well as to their contrary cases, That is, the four processes above occur to bahu and the rest of the subdivisions respectively. Setaränām' are the antithetic concepts, c. g., al pa against bahu and eka-vidha against bahu-vidha. Thus we have twelve
