Pushkarmuni Abhinandan Granth

Author(s): Devendramuni, A D Batra, Shreechand Surana
Publisher: Rajasthankesari Adhyatmayogi Upadhyay Shree Pushkar Muni Abhinandan Granth Prakashan Samiti

Page 320

The Relativity of Naya In Jaina Logic
PUE
or object can be thought to have only one quality which may die out in course of time or having no quality at all. It is, therefore, essential that objects must be constituted of such elements or attributes some of which may be permanent and some may be changing. Things and beings, therefore, are to be considered as a synthesis of opposites, such as existence and non-existence, permanent and change, oneness and manyness, or identity and change, so that from the standpoint of substance (dravya), an object may be thought to be permanent and from the viewpoint of modes (paryāyas) it may be taken as changing. This is why all assertions with respect to the nature of things can be true only relatively, i.e., from some specific point of view. And this is what 'naya' aims to fulfil annulling all absolute and ekāntic view of things which, according to Jainas may be interpreted as smacking of violence (hiṁsa) and vitiated with falsehood. Considering the fact that we human beings, subjected to many shortcomings, can have only limited vision of things, we cannot grasp the entire nature of reality all at once. Consequently, the naya view of things is the only alternative left. It is a point of view with which the knowing mind works in achieving any knowledge and in this the mind is guided by certain intent or purpose (sarkalpa). And because an entity has infinite attributes, 'the Methods are infinite.' "A Method character belongs to the speaker's intents, which are satisfied with one of the attributes. And to this effect......as many as are the ways of statement, just so many are the Method-statements." Here a brief account of the important Method-statements may be fruitful and which will acquaint us with the Jainas penetrating vision of the reality too.
III Considering the various ways of perceiving an object, the 'nayas', broadly speaking, are found to be of two types ---one concerning substance and the other concerning modes. “That which cognises only substance primilarily, is that of substance, and that which cognises only the mode primarily, is that of modes." The first one is called Dravyanaya. In cognising an object, it lays emphasis on its substantial part irrespective of the qualitative or modal aspects. The other form of naya, called Paryāyanaya, lays stress upon the qualitative or modal aspects of things ignoring its substantial part.
In this respect, it may be mentioned here that it is the demand of Jainas' ethics of 'abstenance from falsehood' (satyam) not to conceal one's own shortcomings i.e., even when not being able to cognise the entire aspects of a thing all at once, one should boast of cognising its entire substantial and modal aspects, Hence, the truth demands to embrace the principle of 'naya', which comes to suggest that a thing from a particular point of view, may be considered as substance (dravya) and from that of another, it may be considered as a system of attributes and modes. Besides, this method of apprehending reality also reminds us of Jainas' critical acumen in the field of logic and epistemology.
But the Jaina logician would not rest content only with these two broad distinctions concerning the ways of cognising reality rather they further make a thorough critical analysis of the various viewpoints. And since the phenomenal reality is many-faced (anantadharma), so the ways of cognising its nature cannot be one, but many. Hence in accordance with the various aspects of things and beings, various nayas have been conceived.
Thus, of the substantial (dravya) naya, we can mention three forms-the non-distinguisehd (naigmanaya) the generic (samgrahanaya) and the empirical (vyavahāranaya). In general, all of them may be classed under arthanaya, as they refer to objects or meanings (artha). Similarly, the modal aspect (paryāyanaya) may be classified under four important types-the straightexpressed (riusatra), the verbal (sabda), the subtle (samabhirudha) and the such like (evambhata). In general these three may be called sabdanayas considering their specific reference to words (sabda). Thus, broadly speaking, we have seven forms of naya-three coming under the class 'dravyanaya' and four under that of paryāyanaya'. A brief discussion of these may be useful to our purpose, for these also reveal the farsightedness of the Jainas' understanding in the field of epistemology and logic.