Pushkarmuni Abhinandan Granth

Author(s): Devendramuni, A D Batra, Shreechand Surana
Publisher: Rajasthankesari Adhyatmayogi Upadhyay Shree Pushkar Muni Abhinandan Granth Prakashan Samiti

Page 346

Pramāna and Naya in Jaina Logic
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a part of what is real. This is how the Jaina thinker differentiates a sakalādeśa vakya from a vikalādeśa vākya. This distinction, however, is expressed in the traditionalistic jargon ; but it may be stated in the ordinary language as the distinction between a specific description and a general description of what is real. A sakaladeśa sentence is used to give a general description; while a sentence is employed to give a specific description of what is real. Both the types of sentences, however, are used to describe what the Jaina thinker calls satil or reality. And, it seems to me that differentiating these two types of description sentences is a perfectly legitimate thing to do for purposes of describing reality. But unfortunately the distinction cannot be exploited to explicate the logical difference between a Pramāna vākya and a naya vāk ya. Logically, both a sakalādesa sentence and also a vikalādeśa sentences are bearer of true (of course, contingently true) information. Whether the information communicated by means of them in true or false is something which depends entirely upon what pramāna is adduced in support of them. If the sentences are well-supported by one or more pramāna they are said to be true, and if they are ill-supported they are said to be false. The Jaina assertion 2 that a sakalādeśa vākya is a pramāņa vākya while a vikalādeśa vakya is a naya vākya is simply untenable. Differentiating a pramāna vākya from a naya väkya on the basis merely of the extent or quantum of information they are used to communicate, will not do. We need a different criterion for distinguishing a pramāna vāk ya from a naya vākya from the criterion on the basis of which we differentiate a sakalādeśa vākya from a vikalādeśa väkya. The Jaina thinker, it seems to me, has failed to see that the distinction between the first type of sentences necessarily requires the notion of truth or confirmation, while the distinction between the second type of sentences really does not. And if he uses the same criterion of division in both the cases, the Jaina logician could then be accused of having committed what in the traditional logic is known as the fallacy of cross division.
(4) Now, consider an example of a vikalādesa sentence : (F) This object has existence.
Consider also an example of a naya väkya : (G) This object has existence.
If you look at (F) and (G), both are identical sentences; and logically also they have the same status. The Jaina thinker, however, classifies them differently. Why he does this, is not at all clear. It is not clear at least to me. He may have very good reasons for doing this; but no where, so far as I know, does he state or even suggest what reasons he has to characterise them differently. At the same time, he would not identify them as the same sentences. If he did this he will have to say that, as a naya vāk ya when prefixed by the word syāt or kathamcit becomes a pramāna vāk yal' so in the same manner a vikaladeša vākya when prefixed by the word syät or kathamcit would acquire the status of a sakaladeśa sentence. But, I do not think that this consequence is acceptable to the Jaina thinker. This can be shown as follows. Consider an example of a sakaladeša vākya :
(H) This object has infinite properties.
This sentence satifies the condition of a sakaladeśa sentence.
Prefix now the word syāt or kathamcit to the vikalādesa sentence an example of which is the sentence (F) above, and the resulting sentence would be
(I) This object has the property of existence as one of its infinite properties.
The two sentences (H) and (I) are in no way logically equivalent ; nor are they semantically equivalent. Besides, the sentence (I) gives more information than the information given by the sentence (H). It follows that even if the prefixing of the word syāt or kathamcit to a naya sentence turns it into a pramāna väkya, the same device does not turn a vikalädeśa sentences into a sakalādeśa vākya. The point of the argument is that the criterion of distinguishing a pramāna väkya from a naya vakya must be different from the criterion of differentiating a sakalādeśa väkya from a vikalādeśa vākya.