Pushkarmuni Abhinandan Granth

Author(s): Devendramuni, A D Batra, Shreechand Surana
Publisher: Rajasthankesari Adhyatmayogi Upadhyay Shree Pushkar Muni Abhinandan Granth Prakashan Samiti

Page 708

Some Amphibious Expressions in Umāsvāti
+--++++++++++++++++++++++
+++
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++
++++++++++++
But this is a minor point. Let us consider the other way of explaining Dravyas. Here we are told that to be existent is the symptom or definition of a Dravya,Understood in this way, anything that is existent is Dravya and anything that is Dravya is existent. This seems to be slippery and ambiguous. It seems difficult to accept that anything that is existent is Dravya, for although there are Guņas, Paryāyas etc., just on that count we do not call them Dravyas. Further, when we use 'exists' or its near synonyms with reference to different items, we do not use it in the same sense. For example, we do say, there is a table, there is a ghost, there is an idea in my mind, there is a human society etc. Statement of existence or obtainability does not necessarily seem to have an ontological implication. For, at least sometimes, existential claims are ontologically sterile and impotent. Hence, even if it is said that Dravyas exist, does not entail that each one of them is a part of the furniture of the world. Secondly, it also seems difficult to accept that anything, that is, Dravya is existent. This contention seems to stem from the normal convention that anything that is considered to be a Dravya is mentioned in the nominative case. But unfortunately the converse of this does not hold. For, although Gunas, Pardyāyas etc. could be mentioned in the nominative, none of them has a substantial implication. Thus, substantive usage of an expression and its substantial import do not necessarily go hand in hand. Substantive usage, however, has substantival implication but not necessarily a substantial one. The distinction could be brought out in a technical language saying that whereas substantial is objectlinguistic, substantial is metalinguistic. Substantive usage and its substantial implication may seem to meet in some cases; but this is more an accident than a rule. It is for this reason that acceptance of the co-extensivity of the sets of Dravyas and Sats seems very difficult both to entertain and justify. Unfortunately, Pūjyapāda goes a step further, saying that the expression Sat and Dravya are synonymous. 20 And that appears more difficult to sustain.
Another anticipatory question is raised by Umāsvāti. What is Sat? The question is answered saying anything is Sat, provided it is generated or has a beginning in time, undergoes change and yet retains its unity or continuity.21 These features any Sat is supposed to exhibit conjunctively and not disjunctively. Now, if Sat and Dravya are the same, then Dharma, Adharma, Akāśa and Pudgala too must exhibit these features of Sat. Now, we are told by Umāsvāti himself that, of the five Dravyas. every Dravya except Jiva is a Nit yadravya.** It seems, therefore, difficult to accept Dharma, Adharma, Akāśa and Pudgala are Nity, and exbibit the features of Uupāda, Vyaya and Dhrauvya.
It may be argued that when Ut pāda is spoken of with regard to Nitya Dravyas it does not mean that they themselves are produced. Rather it means that they have the potentiality of producing others.23 But this would be the case provided the expression Utpāda is used equivocally. And there does not seem to be any indication to that effect. Hence, this argument, designed to give Umāsväti a benefit of doubt, also seems to turn out to be an equally weak link.
To turn to the other definition of a Dravya. According to it a Dravya is that which has Gunas as well as Paryayas. 4 Taking this definition of Dravya together with that of Sat would raise two questions : (a) how is one to reconcile them? (b) why are these two definitions, if Dravya and Sat are the same? First, coming to the problem of reconciliation. It has been maintained that what are called generation and corruption (to use Aristotelian phraseology) with regard to any Sat are nothing else than what are called Paryāyas with regard to a Dravya. What, on the contrary, is called Dhrauvya (continuity or unity) with regard to Sat is nothing else than what is called Guna with reference to a Dravya. Thus, understood, it does not raise any dust of inconsistency. But ambiguity it does not seem to free itself of completely. For, if Dravya is Sat and Sat is Dravya and if difinitions of Dravya and Sat are to be understood with regard to each one of them, there does seem to remain a weak point at least with regard to Dharma, Adharma, Akäśa and Pudgala, if not with regard to the Tattras like Asrava, Bandha, Saṁvara Nirjara and Mokşa, as well. Because, if Tattvas are Dravyas and Dravyas are Sats,