Pushkarmuni Abhinandan Granth

Author(s): Devendramuni, A D Batra, Shreechand Surana
Publisher: Rajasthankesari Adhyatmayogi Upadhyay Shree Pushkar Muni Abhinandan Granth Prakashan Samiti

Page 344

Pramāņa and Naya in Jaina Logic
Rom
Pramana and Naya in Jaina Logic
V. K. Bharadhwaja Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla.
(1) Pramāna and Naya are two cardinal concepts in the Jaina theory of knowledge of what there is or what the Jainas say there is. It is almost impossible to say as to what the Jaina thinker is doing in the vast literature on the methodology of knowledge without our having a reasonably clear idea of his usage of the terms Pramāņa and Naya. But when one wants to seek clarity on the issue of distinguishing Pramāna from Naya and the two from their related concept spät one feels simply baffled. At least, this is how I felt when I found myself confronted with the following statements of the Jaina position on the question whether Naya is or is not a Pramāna and what after all is the connection, if any, between the two :
(T) The class of Pramana sentences includes the whole class of Naya sentences. Only
when the word syāt or kathamcit is prefixed to a Naya sentence that it acquires the
logical status of a Pramana. (T.) The Naya consists in the particular intention of the knower who, suspending his
judgment about the other parts, takes notice of one particular aspect of an object
which is known through the Pramāņa of the scriptures. (T2) The Naya sentences are used to communicate knowledge, but they cannot be said to
be either Pramāņa or Apramāna.
The above three theses T, T, and Ty, it seems to me, are quite different from one another. The thesis T suggests that, unless a Naya sentence is prefixed by the word syāt or kathamcit, the naya sentence will not qualify to be a pramāna-vakya. The thesis T, treats a naya sentence as a claim to knowledge, that is, a pramāņa, and when it is conjoined to the thesis T..
(T.) As Pramăna adds to knowledge by removing ignorance, so does Naya adds to know
ledge by removing ignorance.
The obvious thing that strikes one's mind is that a naya sentence communicating as it does knowledge of only one aspect of any thing must itself be a pramāna. It is plain then that if you accept the thesis Ti you just cannot subscribe to the thesis T, conjoined to the thesis T. And conversely also. Faced with the dilemma of choosing one or the other alternative you are offered the thesis Ty, namely, that a naya sentence cannot be said to be either pramāņa or apramāņa. Apparently, the Jaina thinker has a way out of this discomforting situation. He may point out that we have misunderstood his position altogether. Prefix the word syāt or kathamcit to the naya sentence.
(A) A naya sentence is a pramāņa
and to (B) A naya sentence is not a pramāņa
and you obtain three perfectly consistent sentences