Pushkarmuni Abhinandan Granth

Author(s): Devendramuni, A D Batra, Shreechand Surana
Publisher: Rajasthankesari Adhyatmayogi Upadhyay Shree Pushkar Muni Abhinandan Granth Prakashan Samiti

Page 345

३०४
श्री पुष्करमुनि अभिनन्दन ग्रन्थ : चतुर्थ खण्ड
(C) Syát, a naya sentence is a pramāņa
and
(D) Syät, a naya sentence is not a pramāna
or (E) Syāt, a naya sentence is pramāna as well as apramäna.
I do not think that this way of going about one's business in a discussion on the methodology of knowledge or the logic of evidence with which the Jaina thinker obviously is concerned will solve or help to solve the problem. My own feeling is that one feels cheated when a solution of this kind is presented to one who is seriously engaged in understanding what the Jaina thinker is really doing when he makes the two notions of naya and pramāna as the core concepts of his theory of knowledge. I propose therefore to follow a different tack to explicate the distinction exploiting of course whatever the relevant texts there are that are available to me.
(2) Consider a few examples that the Jaina thinker has given in order to illustrate his conception of the notion of naya, pramāna and syāt. To say that "Sadeva" or that "This object has existence as its only property" is to exemplify a durnara sentence. Again, to say that "Sat" or "This object has existence" is to exemplify a naya sentence. Finally, to assert “Syát Sat" or that This object has existence as one of its infinite properties" is to make a statement which properly belongs to the class of pramāna sentences. These examples do throw some light on what the Jaina thinker had in mind when he used the words naya and pramana. But, at the same uime, these raise the question, namely; If prefixing syāt or kathamcit to any sentence make it a pramāņa sentence, then how are we going to reconcile this with the other position, namely, that while in a naya sentence one only aspect or property or relation of something is asserted to be known, while in a pramāna-vāk ya, the whole of something is asserted to be known ?? This question arises because the logical form and function of a naya sentence does in no way suggest that the sentence is used to communicate information about the object of knowledge as a whole, that is, about whatever aspects, properties, or relations that object may have either in itself or as it is related to the other objects. And, this is one condition which a pramāna vākya is supposed to satisfy. It is possible that the way I have stated the condition which distinguishes a pramāna vākya from a nuya vākya makes it a very stringent requirement to be satisfied by a pramāna vākya. And, hopefully, it is very likely that the Jaina thinkers never meant it is exactly the way as I have put it. However, in the rich philosophical literature which deals with the question of differentiating a naya vākya from a pramāņa vākya, they have tried to exploit the notion of adeśa in outlining the features which are distinctive of a naya vākya but not of a pramāņa vākya, and also those which are distinctive of a pramāna vāk ya but not of a naya vākya.
(3) The relevant Dictionary meaning of the word adeśa is 'advice, instruction, precept, or rule'. But by an adeśa, the Jaina thinker means a 'point of view. We can look upon some particular thing from different points of view. Observing an object from one and only one point of view to the exclusion of every other, according to the Jaina thinker, does not enable us to describe an object as adequately as one may wish it to be described. It is a different thing altogether that we may be interested in knowing and describing only one aspect or property of the object. But, knowing and describing only one property of the object does not mean knowing and describing its other properties also. This idea of differentiating a specific description of only one property from a general description of an object of knowledge is of the fundamental importance to the Jaina thinker. He employs this idea to divide all adeśa sentences into two sub-types : First sakalādeśa sentences and secondly, vikalādeśa sentences. A vikalādeśa' sentence is used to describe one and only one dharma or property of sat or what is real, while a sakalādesalo sentence is used to give a general description of sat or what is real. To put it differently, a sakalādeśa sentence describes what is real synthetically; it communicates information about the entire, undivided reality, while a vikaladeśa sentence describes the various dharmas or properties of sat analytically it communicates information about an amsa, an aspect or