Pushkarmuni Abhinandan Granth

Author(s): Devendramuni, A D Batra, Shreechand Surana
Publisher: Rajasthankesari Adhyatmayogi Upadhyay Shree Pushkar Muni Abhinandan Granth Prakashan Samiti

Page 705

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श्री पुष्करमुनि अभिनन्दन ग्रन्थ : षष्ठम खण्ड'
objects also. Thus, given objects, that there will be facts is a permanent possibility. Conversely, given facts, that they will comprise of objects is quite understandable. Yet, what facts comprise of are not objects alone. Moreover, facts and objects need not be the same. Umāsvāti does not merely seem to hold that Tattvas and Arthas are the same. He seems also to favour the view that each one of them should in principle be capable of being given empirically. This view would hold provided we are talking about empirical objects and not about any object whatever. Interchangeability of the expressions Tattva and Artha would be a weak link in Umāsvāti's explanation. For, that seems to generate the view that the sets of Tattvas and Arthas are co-extensive. And it seems difficult to accept such a view.
Again in his commentary on 1.2 he mentions that Jiva etc. are Tativas and in I. 4 he proceeds to enumerate them. He enumerates seven Tattvas,' and in the commentary on I. 4 he writes that these are seven kinds of objects. Here there seems to be a slip. Kinds or sorts can be enumerated, but what is enumerated need not necessarily be sorts or kinds. Such enumeration can even be by naming. Naming is an enumerative device but not necessarily a sortal one. For instance, when I enumerate the persons present at the meeting naming them as Ram, Kiran, Ajit etc., I am not enumerating kinds of persons. Here, then, Umāsvāti seems to overlook the distinction between enumerated individuals or objects and kinds of objects which can be enumerated. Thus, in the first instance, it is incorrect to equate Tattvas with Arthas; and further maintain that the same basis and pattern of classification would apply to both of them.
. Further, in his commentary on I. 4 Umāsvāti states that these Tativas (which were earlier taken to be objects or their kinds) are Padārthas. That means, he appears to take the terms Tattva and Padartha as synonymous. But this seems to be an error as would be clear in our further discussion. As in the case of the word Artha or Tattva, Umāsvāti does not register any deviation from the commonly accepted convention regarding the word Padartha. There are three different generally accepted senses of the word Padartha. It may nevertheless be granted that these three senses might not be so understood at the time of Umāsvāti or perhaps even later. For, Pujyapāda, who wrote a commentary on the work of Umāsvāti also does not shed any light on the issue. Be that as it may. But the general context of the word Padārtha leads one to believe that Umāsvāti perhaps uses it in one sense. viz., 'Padasya padena sucitāh và arthah'. this is because as stated earlier, he presumes that the expressions Padartha and Tattva are interchangeable, however loosely they may be.
What seems to have guided Umāsvāti's view is that both Tattvas and Padarthas can be enumerated. Prima facie, this contention is sound as far as it goes. Enumerative, rather than classificatory statement of Padārthas appears to be common to the discussion of Padarthas by the Prācina Nyāya and that by Umāsvāti. Similarly, the Samkhyas as also Umāsvāti adopt the enumerative pattern while enlisting their Tattvas. But this seems to be too weak a ground for Padarthas being equated with Tattvas. Equation of Tattvas with Padārthas seems to be Umāsvāti's innovation. But let it not be forgotten that innovations, philosophical or otherwise, should be meaningful and tenable. The only point which Umāsvāti seems to bring to the focus successfully is that both Tattvas and Padārthas can be mentioned by enumeration. But this does not warrant the equation of the two.
As one proceeds in one's study of Umasväti's works one begins to notice yet weaker links in his explanatory observations. Whereas consideration of Tattvas presupposes no use of communicative language and the scheme of concepts it brings in, that of Padārthas does presuppose them. For, by Tattvas one may minimally mean the topics around which a philosophical discussion is designed to centre. It is irrelevant and redundant whether any statements are made about them or whether anything is attempted to be communicated about them. Regarding Padārthas, on the contrary, the case seems to be different. They presuppose language and communication, no matter whether successful or not. This being the case, it seems misleading to suppose that Tattvas and Padarthas are the same. Further, there can be no language, which is bereft of concepts. Any consideration of and in terms of Padarthas, therefore, presupposes some