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INTRODUCTION.
LXVII
V
of reason and who would state whatever he finds logically valid whether the scriptures support him or not, takes a different position. He attacks the position of those who accept that colour, taste, smell and touch are independent cognisable qualities that have substance as their substratum (davvanugayā). He says guna and paryaya are synonyms signifying. the same concept: because lord Mahāvīra has described only two Nayas, Dravyarthika and Paryāyārthika, and there is no third Naya as Gunarthika which might have been necessary in case guna was different from paiyāya; because the lord has preached to Gautama and others as vannapajjavehim etc.; and because the definitions of guna and paryaya that are given are of the same meaning; etc. etc. This attack, apparently directed against the Nyaya-Vais'esika, includes, by the further reference to two Nayas, even the Jaina authors like Kundakunda and Umāsvāti, because they accept only two Nayas and still maintain guas as distinct from paryayas.
A
KUNDAKUNDA'S POSITION STATED AND SIDDHASENA'S OBJECTIONS EXPLAINED AWAY.-I am perfectly aware that the line of demarcation is a slippery ground especially because of the confusion between the Jaina and Vais esika positions, but so far as the position taken by Kundakunda and Umāsvāti is taken into consideration they have enough justification as shown above. Siddhasena, I think, has confused, the Nyaya-Vais'eṣika and Kundakunda's positions. The term guna is a blank cheque in the Sanskrit language,* and one has to be cautious in scrutinizing the different shades of meaning even though the same word might have been used for all practical appearance. The Samkhya gunas, for instance, are not mere qualities but something substantial. According to Kundakunda guna is an essential differentia of a substance, and a substance without guna has no existence; the relation between guna and dravya is that of difference-in-congruency. According to Nyaya school, however, the substance in the first moment of its creation is without qualities, and only in the next moment it comes to be intimately united with them. Secondly many of the Nyaya-Vais'esika gunas like s'abda etc. are no more gunas according to Jainism but merely forms of matter. Lastly the qualitative difference in atoms corresponding to air, fire, water and earth as accepted by the Vais'esikas is not possible according to Jainism. Thus therefore the Jaina and Nyaya-Vais'esika ideas about guna should not be confused. It is already shown how Kundakunda has clearly stated that guna is different from paryaya; gunas and paryayas are different can be shown by an illustration as well: taking a golden pot and an earthen one, the paryaya is the same but the gunas of gold and earth are not the same; and secondly taking a golden ring and a golden bangle, the qualities with the substratum gold are the same but the paryayas are different. So, if paryāyas and
1 See gathis S-14 etc. of the 3rd kanda of Sanmati-tan haprakar ana, with Abhayadeva's commentary, Ed. by Becharadas and Sukhalal, in five parts, Ahmedabad, 1930.
2 See Nyayalos'a under guna p. 261.
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Max Müller: Six systems of Indian Philosophy, 1st Ed., p. 468.
4 Pravacanasana II, 40, Pañcastikaya (SBJ III) p. 84 etc.; and Davvasamgaha 16 (SBJ I, p. 47).
