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PRAVACANASĀRA,
. COMPARATIVE AND CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE NATURE OF SPIRIT.-- Upanigadic texts like Maitrāyanīya start the creative process with Prajāpati who' enters the various creatures in the form of the breath apparently becomes the agent of everything like good and bad acts but in fact' unaffected by them. But further we are told that the actual agent is another Ātman called Bhūtātman who under the influence of Prakrti becomes manifold! The first position is a thorough theistic one. The second position is perhaps the modification of the first possibly under Sāmkhya influence. The second position comes nearer the Jain idea, though the Jainas do not accept any such One Ātman which is capable of becoming manifold. Jainas and Mimāmsakas agree in holding that Atman is constituted of. caitanya, and that there is a multitude of separate souls. Pleasure and pain come to be experienced because of karmic association according to Jainism, while Mīmāmsakas simply say that they are changes in the soul-stuff. In the condition of liberation the soul, according to Mīmāmsā, exists without cognition, but Jainism holds that the liberated soul is an embodiment of cognition and knowledge and of all bliss; that may be one of the reasons why Mīmāmsā and Jainism differ on the possibility of omniscience for a liberated soul. Puruşa of the Samkhya can be compared with Jaina Ātman, with the difference that Ātman in Jainism is not merely a spectator, unbound etc., but he is already bound by karmas and will one day be liberated. Sāmkhya has a tinge of idealism. Jainism is realistic, and Ātman is a substance endowed with sentiency as distinguished from pudgala or matter which is devoid of sentiency; these two constitute the objective existence with time etc. The Jaina Ātman is a permanent individuality and will have to be distinguished from Buddhistic Vijñānas which rise and disappear, one set giving rise to a corresponding set. In Brahmajālasutta various tenets, as distinguished from Buddhistic views have been described ; the classification is subjectwise and not systemwise. Taina conceptions of spirit and matter agree to a great extent with the Sassatavādas which, it is interesting to note, is attributed to Siamaṇas and Brāhmaṇas, and which is not correct in the eye of Ksanikavāda of Buddhism, Jainism is pluralistic and the Ātmans are many, nay infinite, and they retain their individualities even in liberation as distinguished from Advaita Vedānta wherein ultimately Ātman is one and eternal, and all other forms of existence are not real but merely the shades of the same. In the temperate monism of
1 Belvalkar & Ranade: Hsstory of Indian Philosophy, Creative period p. 337. 2 Dr. Belvalkar: 'Samkhya, Realism or Idealism', Dayananda Commemoration volume,
Ajmer, 1934, pp. 19-24. 3 Discussing about the nature of Siddha, Kundakunda accepts a very modest and relative
position clearly stating that extremes are not acceptable. In this context (see PascāstiRüya 37 ) quite incidentally & statement is made:
sassudam adha ricchedam bhavvam abharram ca sunnam idaram ca /
innänam arinnānam na ni jujjadi asadi sabbhave ll 37 11 This gātha, so far as I understand it independent of the commentators, has in viele
S'as'vatavāda, Ucchedavāda, S'ünyavāda and Vijūānaväda which are very often referred . to.in Buddhist texts. (See E. J. Thomas: The History of Buddhist thought, pp. 124 etc.).
Ucchedavāda is said to have been the view of Ajita Kesakamabali.
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