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LXXXIV
PRAVACANASĀRA. self-contradictory theory of conditional predications, are already present in Jainism. The object of knowledge is a huge complexity constituted of substances, qualities and modifications, extended over three times and infinite space, and simultaneously subjected to origination, destruction and permanence. Such an object of knowledge can be comprehended only in omniscience. The senses are the indirect means of knowledge, and whatever they apprehend is partial like the perception of an elephant by those seven blind persons. The ordinary human being cannot rise above the limitations of his senses; so his apprehension of reality is partial, and it is valid only from a particular view-point: this leads to the Nayavāda of the Jainas. When ordinary human knowledge is partial, a new method of stating our approach to the complex reality had to be devised, and that is Syādvāda, the doctrine of conditional predications. Thus the doctrine is a direct result of the strong awareness of the complexity of the object of knowledge and of the limitations of human j apprehension and expression. The substance is subjected to 'a constant flux of modifications, and we always look at it through one modification or the other, present or absent. When we are looking at its present modification, we should not absolutely deny the past or future ones: this peculiar position leads us to conditional affirmation, conditional negation and conditional indescribability, which by their combination give rise to seven possible statements. Kundakunda makes it clear that Syādvāda is postulated because of this eternal flux of modifications
SYĀDVĀDA IN HIGHER AND LOWER KNOWLEDGE.Students, very much imbued with the spirit of Vedānta, have always looked upon this », approach to reality as a process of uncertainty and indefiniteness of knowledge ;
and a question is very often raised whether Syädvāda refers to Higher knowledge or to lower knowledge or to both. If it refers to Higher knowledge, then Jainism is a quagmire of uncertain statements which lead to nowhere; if it refers to lower knowledge, then Jainism has not reached the plain of Higher knowledge; and if it refers to both, then Jainism, with such a logic of indefiniteness, will more mislead than lead its followers to its religious or spiritual destiny. These alternatives, that might be put forth by the Vedānta, whether accepted or rejected in parts or in toto, appear to be very dangerous. It is necessary, therefore, that the Jaina position should be clearly explained. It must be remembered that the terms Higher knowledge and lower knowledge are imported from Vedānta. According to Vedānta Higher knowledge consists in realising the transcendental truth of the identity of the self, after being immune from upādhis, with Brahman for eternity; while lower knowledge consists in the knowledge of the worship of Brahman in his phenomenal state
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1 for a detailed discussion about Sgādvāda uce my article in Juinnt Gazelto Vol. 265
pp. 188-97. 2 In Paficāstilüya it is snid that the soron Bheagas aro possiblc ūdesatasena, while in
Pravacanasära, pajjâyera durerari: practically it means the same, because paryaya or the modification is the essential subject of ades'a, the statement of information.
