Book Title: Sambodhi 1976 Vol 05
Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, H C Bhayani
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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Page 108
________________ Bimal Krishna Matilal or modification, is not even defined in the Tattvarthasutras The Jaina ontological principle of anekantata 'non-onesidedness', however, 18 not compatible with the rigid Vaiseşika notions of substance and quality Thus, Siddhasena has added that it would be as good as a heresy in Jainism, if one intends to make the notion of substance absolutely different from that of quality 25 Moreover, Siddhasena has argued, the supposed distinction between qualities and modea (tacltly accepted by b-th Umasvati and Kundakunda) should also be discarded altogether in order to remain true to the Jaina spirit.20 10 Siddhasena's philosophic insight in this regard was commendable. According to him, reality should be viewed from the two important atand points, being and becoming, permanence and change. That is why Lord Mahavira acknowledged only two nayas or standpoints "substance exists" and "modification exists".27 If x is an element of reality, then, according to Siddhasena, x can be viewed as a SUBSTANCE from the standpoind of being, and aa a PROPERTY from the standpoint of becoming. The standpoint of 'becoming' (modification) reveals that everything originates, stays and perishes; the standpoint of 'being' ("it 18") reveals everything exists eternally without birth or decay 28 And, Siddhasena asserts, there cannot be being without becoming. or becoming without being, therefore, a subatance (reality) is defined as the combination of being with becoming, 1.e., origin, decay and stability 20 Siddhasena connects the 'being' aspect with generalization and the 'becoming aspect with particularization It is pointed out that in our ordinary description of things, we necessarily combine the general with the particular. From the point of view of the highest generalization, a thing ia described as "it is" which reveals the parmanent being, the substance. But when, in ordinary descriptions, a thing is called a piece of wood, or a chair, or a red chair, we have an intermixture of being' and 'becoming' aspects In so far as the thing 18 identified as a non-fluctuating substance, it is the 'being' standpoint And in so far as the attributes of the thing, such as being a piece of wood, being a chair, or redness, are revealed by the description, it is the 'becoming' standpoint Qualities are nothing but modes or states of the substance In any characterization or description of the thing there is thus an overlap of being' and 'becoming standpoints, ontil we reach the ultimate particularity, pure becoming', i,e., the pointinstants (kşanas) of the Buddhists.30 25 Siddhasena, Sanmart, Ch III, verses 8-9. 26 Ibid, verse 9-15 27 Ibid., Ch III, verse 10 28 Ibid, Ch I, verse 7 29 Ibid, Ch I, verses 11 & 12, 30 bid, Ch I. verse 9. I

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