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the possibility of omniscience for man without fearing that it would make the Śruti redundant, because it holds that man can be sarvajña only with the help of Śruti. It may be, however, noted that sarvajñatva is understood in two senses as seems to be hinted in the expression yo sarvajñaḥ sarvavit. Sarvajñatva may mean knowing the essence or reality of everything. Knowing Brahman as the reality of everything ( satyasya satyam) is knowing everything. Sarvajñatva may also mean knowing the particular details of everything. The mimamsa objects to the concept of sarvajñatva in the latter sense. Is it possible for man with all his finitude to know everything? If it is possible, can one sarvajña deffer from another sarvajña? That Kapil and Gautam differ shows that neither is sarvajña. While this objection seems to be sound, there is a counterobjection which is worth considering. How is it possible to deny sarvajñatva in the case of all? One may deny it in the case of A. B and C but how can anyone deny it in the case of all? It seems that it requires a sarvajña to deny sarvajñatva in the case of all persons, past, present and future. This is how the debate goes on and it seems to us that one has to depend only on faith for the acceptance of sarvajñatva. But so far as sarvajñatva in the sense of knowing the essence or reality of everything is concerned, it seems to be quite intelligible even intellectually.
A word may be said about syādvāda, because the last few chapters of the book are devoted to a vindication of this doctrine. Most of the systems of Indian philosophy are realists-Samkhya-Yoga, Nyaya-Vaiśesika, Purvamimämsä, the theistic schools of Vedānta and the Hinayana systems of Buddhism. Jainism too belongs to the same class. Every realism has two features: it is empiricistic and it is not able to accept anything as unreal or false. Jainism too shares those features; its additional feature is that it regards other schools as ekantavādin. I think this is a fitting reply to other realists. If all experience has to be accepted, then syādvāda becomes invevitable. The credit of Jainism is that it develops a complete logic for it. The only question that arises in this context is whether the logic applies to absolutism also. Absolutism of the type of Advaitism and the Madhyamika is not one view (bhanga ) among other views and does not refer to one thing or one aspect among other
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