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OXI VIII
TOREWORD.
.(iii) Arthâpattiparikgå.
Examination of Presumption. S'abarasvåmin accepts presumption as a different proof, which splits itself into two divisions, seen and heard. If a cloth is thrown into the fire it burns. Either on seeing or hearing this we conclude that fire has the power to burn things. On seeing the rise and setting of the sun we conclude that the sun has movements. This knowledge of unknown things are caused by the proof of presumption.
Refutation. • Presumption cannot be accepted as a valid proof as these kinds of knowledge can be produced by inference. Again, there is no power which is to be known by presumption except the things wbich are held as endowed with powers. And these things such as fire, etc. also are known by the proof of perception.
(iv) Abhâvapramåņapariksa. Examination of non-existence as a valid proof. The Mimåmsakas accept non-existence as a different proof. The absence of all proofs is a proof indeed because we know from that the absence of a thing. This absence of proof for a thing is caused when the eternal Vijñana is not changed on reflecting a thing, or when the Vijñâna reflecting some other thing than that is not existing. The absence of a thing may also have a fourfold division, such as, Pragbhđua (antecedent) Pradhvarsdbhava ( subsequent), Anyonyabhava (mutual) and Atyantábháva (absolute ). Thus non-existence is also an entity. So the absence of proof to ascertain a thing, proves the absence of that thing, and becomes one of the proofs.
Refutation. If only the absence of perception, etc. can prove the nonexistence of a thing, then in sleep and in unconcious stages many non-existent things can be known, because sleep also is an unobangod state of Vijñana. If the non-existence of a thing and the nonexistence of proofs are realentities, then why this could not be seen by
