Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 65

790
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XIX.
place outside the house, or the place outside the house qualified by Chaitra ; in either case, how could the absence of Chaitra, which resides elsewhere (inside the House) serve as the Probans ? That is to say, it could never serve as the Probans.
Then again, if absence in the House were assumed as the Probans.-it could be so assumed only in one or the other of two ways-i.e. either as the absence of the living Devadatta, in the House, or absence in the House in general. In the former case, there would be this objection--that the absence of the living man, etc. etc. there can be no cognition of this absence, etc. etc. That is, the cognition of the living Deviatta-the certainty regarding it-would not be possible until his presence outside is definitely known.
What is meant by this is that the Probans in this case would be one that is inndmissible, and that if it is admissible, it is futile.
If the second alternative is accepted [i.e. absence in the House in general is the Probans), the Probans would be Inconclusive; as even when Devadatta is dead, people recognise his absence in the House. This is what is shown in the words as for pure absence in the House, etc., etc. - Vidyamanatua' is being alive.-(1602-1606)
With the following Texts begin the refutation of the above view (regarding Presumption as a distinct Means of Cognition).
In the first place, the definition that has been provided is not a proper one. For instance, the definition provided is that Presumption consists in the presuming of an imperceptible fact without which a perceived or heard of fact would not be possible'. In connection with this, the following points have to be considered :-Has the relation of that imperceptible fact with the perceived and heard of facts been perceived anywhere, or not! If it has been perceived, then the cognition in question becomes an Inference, as brought about by the perception of the said Relation.-If the Relntion has not been perceived, then, in that case, the non-burning power of Fire might also be presumed, in the same way as its burning power is; because no far By being not related is concerned, both stand upon the same footing.--It might be argued that "inasmach as Fire has never boon actually found to be associnted with non-burning power, there can be no presumption of this latter"-But in that case, there should be no presumption of the burning power also; because Fire has never been seen to be associated with that power. Thus it is only when the relation between two things is well known that, on seeing one of the two invariably concomitant members of that relation, there can be a prosumption of the other relative and when this has been presumed, it is only through the said Relation; and hence this presumption becomes included under Inference
The examples also that have been cited are not right. These examples have been cited to show that through four Presumptions one cognises the Potency of something known through Perception and the other Means of Cognition.
The author points out the defect that is common to all these :