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Multi-dimensional Application of Anekantavāda
of its own individuality and does not exist apart from and outside this nature (Sarvamasti Svarūpeṇa pararūpeṇa nástica) as we have already seen. In relativistic standpoint both, being and non-being can exist together. Everything is real only in relation to and distinction form every other thing. The Law of Contradiction is denied absolutely in this respect. The point is only that the absolute distinction is not a correct view of things, according to Jainism.
As regards the triple character (origination, destruction, and permanence) of reality, the Jainas support it through Anyathānupapannatvahetu. The Buddhists themselves are of the view that a thing perishes immediately after its origination, and this continuity never ends. The continuity of moments of similar moments (sajātīyakşaņas) is considered the material cause (Upādāna Kāraṇa). This is in fact nothing but only Dhrau vya or a permanent feature of the Jainas and the Santāna(continuity) of the Buddhists. Without accepting dhrau vya or santāna, memory (Smrti), recognition (Pratyabhijnāna), bondagesalvation (Bandha-mokṣa)etc., would disappear from field of experience. Therefore, the permanent element is essential for the circulation into the modes.
The permanent element possesses the character of identity-indifference (bhedābhedavāda). Identity is used in the sense that the substance and its modes cannot be separated form a realistic standpoint, and difference in the sense that they are different in name, number, etc., from a practical viewpoint. In other words, the modes are not absolutely different from substance, as in that case the modes would not belong to the substance. With past reflections the substance is transferred into present modes and proves itself as a cause of future modes that are necessary for the understanding of the permanent character of an entity.
To preserve the unity of terms in relation to different characters, the Jainas assert an element which is called Jätyantara (unique). They maintain that a reality is a synthesis of identity-in-difference and each synthesis is Jātyantara." This is illustrated by the instance of Narasimha, which is criticised by the Buddhist philosophers. Prabhācandra says in response to the Buddhist criticism about Narasimha that it is neither naranor simha, but because of their similarities they are called Narasimha.
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