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Indian Philosophical School and Anekāntavāda
accommodative and accomplished. But it is fact that Jainism is categorised as a system of non-violence philosophy although its claims to have emerged from the thought of Vedic sages can not be ruled out. Like Cārvāka and Bauddha it is regarded as a system of heterodox schools of philosophy. Some principal systems of orthodox school of Indian philosophy have been very critical towards Jainism particularly with regard to its doctrine of Syadvāda and Anekāntavāda. Ācārya Sankara has been very critical to its doctrine of Syadvada and concept of soul. There is nothing critical in Madhvacārya's description of Jainism. He has most faithfully represented the essential of Jainism as an independent system of philosophy complete in itself. Similarly, Sarva Siddhanta Sangraha, a work that is exclusively attributed to Samkarācārya described Jainism as the third darśana in its collection of twelve darsanas. It places Jainism between Lokayata darśana and Buddhism. This placing implies that Jainism is higher than Lokayata darśana which has the lowest place in Sarva-siddhanta Sangraha, and lower than Buddhism of course. In this work the highest darśana is Advaita Vedānta. The Vedantic appraisal of Jainism however is based more on the Jaina doctrine of the soul than on its Anekānta.
The spirit of free thinking has led Jaina philosophers to significant debates and discussions with Nyaya, Pūrva Mimāǹsā and Buddhist Philosophers in particular. Consequently they have propounded several theories which have traditionally become the part and parcel of the main stream of Indian logic. Further they have written commentaries upon Buddhist and Vaiseṣika and Nyāya works also a fact that shows that they were really free thinkers and non-sectarians. They in fact excelled in the theory of classification and used it in the analysis of all concepts. Moreover, they developed a theory of Nayas, which is different from the theory of Pramāṇas comprehending only a part of that object. In other words 'Pramāņa is sam daya viṣaya'i.e. it knows the object in its completeness, where Naya knows the object in its parts. The range of a Pramāṇa is the whole object in its entirety and naya is its single part. The relation between a Naya and a Pramāṇa is thus that of the part and the whole. Naya is a partial cognition in the full fledged cognition of a Pramāṇa. Yet it does not precedes but follows
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