Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 2

Author(s): G C Chaudhary
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 74

JAINA CONCEPTION CF REALI1Y, 1.E. DRAVYA
.65 fitted to the Buddhist system of thought, as it is found in the Mahabháşya in the following manner: "That whose basic character (maulikatva) remains unimpaired even in the midst of the emergence of newer and newer qualities (gupas) is Dravya (substance)”.46
According to the Buddhist system of thought, “Whatsoever exists is a substance”, as explained by Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmakośa, 47 while Yaśomitra adds : “Whatsoever exists with its own characteristics is a substance”.48 "Inherence of qualities is not in substance"; all real elements, being equally independent in this regard, become substances (dravyas) sui generis as separate entities. Because "an element is something having an essence of its own”. 49
"On account of their fundamental thesis of anātmavāda (nonsubstantialism) the Buddhists did not recognise the Vaišeşika distine ction of Padārthas as dravya (substance), guna (quality), karma (action), etc., but reduced all things to the status of dharmas, i. e. unique momentary ultimate elements. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that the term 'Dravya' is conspicuous by its absence from the Pali Suttas and even from the Abhidharma. The Vaibhashika School, almost replaces the Buddhist term 'dharma'. Here all real dharmas are called dravya."00
All these above interpretations of the word "Dravya' which were first made in the Mahabhāşya and which were adopted in Vyasabhagya, Ślokavārtika, etc., were collected together --for the first time in the Jaina tradition by Umāsvāti in his relevant aphorism. 51
There had been an evolution of the conception of Dravya (substance) with the development of the Jaina metaphysical thought in course of time. In the Digambara view as recorded in Sarvārtha. siddhi, Tattvärtha Rajavartika, and Tattvártha Ślokavārtika, it is exp. lained that "Existance (being or Sat) is the differentia of a substance (Dravya)62, i. e. that which exists is a substance.53 But what is existence (Sat) and what is substance ? In regard to these two problems--the
existence (Sat) and the definition of substance (Dravya), both the Digambara and Svetambara view are one and the saine, for according to both, "existence is characterized by origination, destruc. tion and permanence" 64 and "that which has qualities and modes is a substance. The idea of differentia of a substance (Dravya) is embodied by the Digambara tradition in the Sūtra "Sad-dravyalakşaņam." But it is also implied in the Sūtra "Utpadavyayadhrauvyayuktam Sat” of both the Digambara and Śvetāmbara traditions. Thus, there is no difference between the Digambara and Svetämbara views on the conception of Dravya (substance). Only the concept of it has been