Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 62

OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE
787
unification or commingling of things expressed by the words like Milk and Water, and Contradistinction consists in these things expressed standing in the relation of excluder and excludedor Connection consists in the wellknown relation of cause and affect, and Contradistinction' in the exclusion of the unlike.--In neither of these two forms could the (unspoken) sentence "He eats at night' be the meaning of the (spoken) sentence 'He eats not in the day'. For instance, the words of the sentence He eats not in the day' denote the Day and so forth; and these have no Connection with eating at night, as the two are entirely different. Nor is there 'Contradistinction between them ; because the word 'day' is never used in the sense of the negation of non-night.
It might be argued that—"That he eats at night is another meaning of the same sentence "He eats not in the day."
The answer to this is-Nor can a second meaning, etc. etc. There can be no assumption of another meaning for the same sentence, as it is entirely taken up in expressing the idea of the man not eating in the day, and hence cannot express the other idea that he eats at night. Consequently the idea of the man eating at night must be expressed by another sentence.
* Present in the mind'-This shows that the cognition is not Verbal.
Though it is not verbally expressed',-i.e. even though it is not Verbal, due to words; as in the manner shown above, it cannot be verbal cognition.
For the cognition, then, of the sentence- He eats at night which is understood (in the Mind), some 'Means' will have to be pointed out; which could only be one out of Perception and the rest.-And yet it cannot be any of these. Hence it must be an entirely distinct Means of Cognition.--This is what is meant.
The idea of the required Means being one from among Perception and the rost is next refuted-'As the sentence, etc. etc. -The sentenco expressing the idea of the man eating at night, not being actually spoken, cannot be of the nature of Perception, because it is not heard. Nor can it be of the nature of Inference, because there is no relation (of concomitance). For instance, the sentence expressing the fact of eating at night has never been perceived in association with the sentence speaking of not-eating in the day-which fact alone could constitute the relation of concomitance between the two. Nor is there any other Inferential Indicative available.
It might be argued that,"even without the perception of any relation, it could be regarded as an Inferential Indicative",
The answer to that is- And if, even when. etc. etc. That is to say, if it could be an Inferential Indicativo even when it is not known to be related, then from the utterance of the sentence speaking of the man not-eating in the day, there should follow the cognition of all sentences not only of the sentence speaking of eating at night.-Why ?-Because, as regards being devoid of relation, the sentence speaking of eating at night does not differ from any other sentence; that is, in the point of being not-related, all sentences stand on the same footing.-(1593-1508)
The following Text describes the Presumption based upon Analogical Cognition :