Sambodhi 1984 Vol 13 and 14

Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, Ramesh S Betai, Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 85

E. A. Solomon
(mithya avabhasa) because it is neither the very nature of Brahman nor something different from it, it is neither existent nor non-existent. If it were the characteristic nature of anything, then whether one with it or different from it, it would be a real thing and could not then be called avidya. If it were utterly 11on-existent it would be like the sky-flower and would have no bearing on practical cxperience as avidya has. Thus Avidya has to be recognised as indefinable (anirvacantya). This is an explanation which should be accepted by the adherents of all the different schools of philosophy. 3
It might be argued that the things of appearance might be unreal but the appearance (avabhasa) itself is real and that is exactly what avidya is and so it is real. But this is not correct. If there is nothing which can appear, the appearance also is false and indescribable. Hence. avidya is neither existent nor non-existent; being of this illusory nature it can be dispelled. Avidyā not being 'sat' there is no question of the existence of anything besides Brahman; it not being a sat, there is something which can be set aside. 4
To whom does this Avidya belong? According to Mandana, It belongs to the individual souls. Of course, the indivdual souls are not in reality different from Brahman; but their difference from Brahman is due to kalpanā or imagination. Whose is this differentiating imagina. tion? It cannot be that of Brahman which being of the nature of krow. ledge is devoid of all imagination; nor could it be that of the Jivas sicce ticy themselves are the products of kalpana. Solutions have been proposed by some thinkers. One suggestion is that the word 'maya' signifies what is inconsistent and inexplicable, had it been consistent and explainable it would not be māya but would be real. Others say that avidyā comes from the Jivas and the Jivas from avidyā; this process is beginningless, as in the case of the seed and the sprout, so no fault should be found with this explagation 5 And similarly, those who regard avidyā as the upadana (material cause) of diversity say that it is beginningless and devoid of any motivs, so there is no scope for the question as to what the purpose or motive could be there behind the creation of the world of diversity.
If Avidyt were to belong to Brahman it could not be dispelled even on the realisation of Braliman. If it is Brahman that suffers under an illusion and Brahman that is emancipated, there would be the contingency of universal salvation. The Jivas are transmigratory due to Avidya and they are liberated by means of Vidyā. Vidya is not natural to the Jivas, but adventitious, it is avidya that is natural to the Jivas, as they owe