Sambodhi 1984 Vol 13 and 14

Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, Ramesh S Betai, Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 88

Avidya-its afraya und vişaya
83
like the seed and the sprout. The singular in avyakta or vyākta or the like has in view the generality avidyātva, though avidyās are numerically many. Well, one might say, if Avidya itself is the seed of the world, we can do away with God. But this is not proper. A non-sentient thing is not capable of bringing about anything unless monitored by a sentient entity, so Avidya in order to bring about its effect resorts to God as the nimitta or the upadana. (Amalananda is quick to add that God would be that nimitta in as much as he is the preraka, provoker as scent is in respect of the organ of smell; and he would be the upādāna by virtue of his being the a dhisthana, substratum of the world). Vācaspati says that the world-illusion has God as its adhisthāna as the serpentillusion has the rope as its substratum; so just as the serpent-illusion has the rope as its upādā naso the world-illusion has God as its upādana. Theresore, Avidya though having the jiva as its adhikarana or locus resorts to or takes the support of God as a nimitta or as its object and in this sense it is said to be 'Isvarāśraya', and not because Isvara is the adhara or locus of Avidyā, for Avidyā could not subsist in Brahman which is of the nature of Vidya. It is because of this, argues Vācaspati, that Sankarācārya says that the sansärins lie in Avidya being devoid of the realisation of their own nature. That is to say, Avidyā being there, the souls lie in it. Laya or dissolution is signified by 'They lie devoid of the realisation of their nature; by samsārinah', viksepa is meant to be signified. (See Bhämati, I 4.3, pp. 377-8)
Amalānanda has tried to answer a very strong objection against the above-mentioned view : If Braliman were the upadana in the sense that being the object of the jiva's illusion or wrong knowledge it is the adhisthāna, of the world -superimposition, then the Srutis 'So' kamayata', 'Sa Svyam akuruta' would not hold good. Moreover, illusion being peculiar to each jiva this would contradict the experience of the world as common to all. And if akaša, etc. were produced by the jiva's bhrama (illusion), they could not have existence which is not known 'ajñata-sattya', i.e. they could not have existence even when they are not perceived, for rope-serpent etc. which are 'bhramaja' have only
fata-sattva 1 Therefore mayā which is common to all and which bears the reflection of God should be accepted as responsible for the world, and its vyastis should be regarded as avidyas which serve as the adjuncts (upadhis)of the jivas. The answer to this objection is : 'Kama' and 'krti' mentioned in the Srutis are vivarta (appearance) of the avidya of jipa (i.e. vivarta of Brahman, the object of jzva's avidya-Kalpataruparimala) and not modifications of Brahman. Vivarta can be the cause of vivarta