Sambodhi 1984 Vol 13 and 14

Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, Ramesh S Betai, Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 136

Rasa and its Pleasurable Nature
This plain inconsistency can only be explained if we take Abhinavagupta's statement comparing rasasvada with parabrahmasvada as a mere arthavada (praise, eulogy) with a view to glorifying rasa.
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The protagonists of the view that all rasas are pleasurable attempt to show that bhavana (generalisation, universalisation, idealisation) or vyanjana-vyāpāra (the power or function of suggestion) effects, temporarily. though, the removal of delusion of mind (moha) or ignorance (ajana) that envelops the mass of bliss innate to the Self (atman); and thereby enable the sahrdaya to appreciate and enjoy the transcendental joy or delight of the self or the bliss of brahman. The advocates of the view that rasas are only laukika (worldly, the same as emotions or states of mind as in actual life) aud are pleasurable or painful in accordance with the pleasant or painful emotions may raise the following objection: "It posses one's comprehension how a literary function like bhavana or vyañjana can transform what is unpleasant into pleasurable rasa. One may admit with the followers of the Vedauta darsana that the cover of delusion of mind or ignorance enveloping the Self or Cit or Caitanya is removed or rent asunder through knowledge of the Ultimate Reality (paramatman or parabrahma) in the case of a person who aspires after mokşa (liberation) and is possessed of the four well-known requisites (including Samadamadi-sädhana sampat) and undertakes the study of edanta, etc., but there is hardly any justification or evidence enough for investing bhāvanā or vyañjana with such extra-ordinary and incredible power." In reply the Kevalananda-vādins (those who hold that all rasas are pleasurable) may say "The facts or events treated poetically may, as parts of the actual life produce pleasure or pain but when they are contemplated in their idealised or generalised form they give rise to pleasure and pleasure alone. As a result of this contemplation of literary objects in their idealised character they become impersonal in their appeal and therefore enjoyable in and for themselves. In other words, the sahrdaya in appreciating poetry or drama or creative literature in general rises above the duality of pleasure or pain as commanly understood, and enjoys higher pleasure or delight. Bhavana 28 leads to spontaneous and complete selflessness or forgetting one's private self and it in its turn yields pure joy unmixed with pain or sorrow or any kind of mental tension. And in this regard it is comparable to brahmasvada; and in regard to such pleasurable experience sabrdayas alone are authority." It is doubtful if this reply would satisfy or convince Sukha-duḥkhatma-vādins. Modern literary thinkers too may not accept the position that in aesthetic experience one enjoys one's own consciousness that consists of a