Sambodhi 1984 Vol 13 and 14

Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, Ramesh S Betai, Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 89

E. A. Solomon
as serpent is of movement: Appayya Diksita in his Parimala explains i clearly Amalananda's argument by saying that commonness of experience can be explained by the fact of the adhisthana being one. Several men may liave the simultaneous illusion of silver (in nacre) when silver is brought about by the avidyās of the several erring persons. If the error of one of these is dispelled and the error in the case of the others continues, then anotlier silver is brought about by the avidyās of all the other persons and thus the commonness of the illusion is possible. This same explanation applies to the world-phenomena, where Brahman is the ultimate reality common to all.11 When one avidyā perishes, the. prapanica, to the production of which it had contributed along with other avidyās, also perishes and then only another prapanca in common to all is brought about by the other avidyās. Amalananda says that the 'ajñatasattval of the prapanca is because of its Vyavaharika sartva and this should not be impossible if the world is produced by the avidyās of the jivas. Even those who regard maya as the cause of the world regard avidya as the cause of one's own senses etc. and these are accepted as having 'ajñatasattva'. Thus may ikatva cannot be said to bring about ajratasattva', as even what is conceived as 'avidyaka' is seen to have it.
From this discussion it can be seen that Vācaspati tries to link up avidya as a congenital disposition with avidyā as the creative force of the world-appearance, and regards the jiva as the afraya of avidya, avidyas being as numerous as the jivas. The world appearance has as its adhisthana Brahman which is the object of the avidyās of the jivas and the avidyas jointly bring about the world-appearance which therefore is cominon to all. Vacaspati has shown in his Bhamati (II. 2. 28) also that all appearances are indescribable entites and not mere mental ideas. The external objects have ajñātasattva, are existent even when they are not perceived as they have empirical existence and are brought about by the beginningless avidya-faktis of all. Thus Vacaspati did not support Dristi-srsti-vada though he regarded the Jivas as the Asrayas of avidyas and though he accepted that each jiva has its own avidya.
We may consider here the philosophical view of Prakasananda though he is quite late, because it was Prakaśānanda wlio developing on the lines of Mandana and Vacaspati gave a consistent presentation af Advaita Vedanta from a thorough-going idealistic point of view. Almost all the teachers of the Kevaladvaita tradition of Sankaracarya interpreted Sarkara's view so as to take for granted the existence of an objective world of appearance as the ground of perceptual presentation. The world