Jaganmohanlal Pandita Sadhuwad Granth

Author(s): Sudarshanlal Jain
Publisher: Jaganmohanlal Shastri Sadhuwad Samiti Jabalpur

Page 200

Eastern and Western Philosophical Approaches 19
Jainism offers us the best example of an epistemology different from the Western one described above. The Jain admits that, in terms of a dualistic, either/or logical system, absolute judgments are possible. But the Jain rejects that possibility. He insists instead that every judgment we make holds good only for the particular aspect of the object judged and only from the point of view from which the judgment is made. Jains call this view syadvada and from it follows the saptabhanginaya or the seven forms of judgment or types of predication. Jain epistemology, then, insists on a seven predicate rather than two predicate logical system.
The story of the blind man and the elephant is often used to illustrate this epistemology. When asked what the elephant was like, each answered in terms of the part of the elephant touched. Since each touched a different part, they could not agree on what the elephant was like and they began to argue violently among themselves. Such disagreement could have been avoided had each accepted the syadvada theory of knowledge. And this points to one of the values of such view, namely that it makes for a much more catholic outlook and the avoidance of strife and factionalism.
I would like to suggest another epistemological difference between East and West The Western way I have already described may be called knowing objectively. The known is conceived of as an object or entity separate from the known. The knower-known relationship is a subject-object one. Another way of knowing found in the East is what might be called knowing empathetically. According to it, knowing requires or involves being empathetic toward, having sympathy for, identifying or becoming one with the known. The relationship between knower and the known is a monistic or unitive, not a dualistic, separatist or detached one. It involves the knower 'getting inside of' the knowu or knowing from the inside, not outside.
An example is this. Knowing an animal such as a horse requires that I view the horse, not as an object, but as a form of life, a life form externally different from myself, of course, but a life form or center of consciousness nevertheless, Thus, if the horse suffers a broken leg, I can be acutely conscious of it. I can emphathize with the horse and feel its suffering as if it were my own. Conversely, if it gallops joyfully over a field, I can likewise feel its elation.
An epistemology of empathy has as its metaphysical correlate monism, or, as the Hindu Vedantist would say, non-dualism. It might be described by saying that, from such a perspective, there is only one category in reality, namely consciousness. And differences are not ones of kind but of degree. One type of existence such as a stone exhibits a lowlevel of consciousness, a plant a higher, a horse still higher, and a person the highest.
The starement above reminds us of two important aspects of Jainism. One is the Ananta-dharmakamvastu view which assests that every object known by us has many and