Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 57

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XIX.
in the shape of a form of Cognition in addition to Inforence, because it is a form of Cognition-like Inference.- Or (6) Inforence has its companion in the shape of a form of Cognition in addition to Perception-because it is a form of Cognition-like Perception. Similarly (c) Specifio Individuality has for its companion cognisable object in addition to the Universalbecause it is cognisable, like the Universal.-Or (d) The Universal has for its companion, a cognisable object in addition to the Specific Individuality, because it is cognisable -- like the Specific Individuality."
This (view of Aviddhakarna) is what is set forth in the following
TEXTS (1584-1586). " ANOTHER PARTY SEEKS TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF ANOTHER FORM OF
COGNITION, ON THE STRENGTH OF INFERENCE, THUS PERCEPTION IS CONNECTED WITH A TORM OF COGNITION DIFFERENT FROM IxFERENCE, BECAUSE IT IS A FORM OF COGNITION, LIKE INFERENCE.
SIMILARLY INFERENCE ALSO.”THIS IS NOT RIGHT; AS THE PROBANS CITED IS NOT INVARIABLY CONCOMI
TANT (WITH THE PROBANDUM); AND SPECIALLY BECAUSE NOTHING IS PUT FORWARD WHICH WOULD NEGATIVE THE CONTRARY OF THE DESIRED CONCLUSION.-FURTHER, IN THIS WAY, YOU WOULD BE RUNNING COUNTER TO THE DOCTRINE OF Four FORMS OF COGNITION'. THE ANSWER THAT YOU WOULD HAVE TO THAT WOULD ALSO SERVE HERE.-(1584-1586)
COMMENTARY. Sargatam -connected, related.
This is only by way of illustration ; it should be understood to apply to the proving of the existence of other cognisable things also.
Nothing has been mentioned by way of negativing the Probans in the contrary of the Probandum ; hence there can be no Invariable Concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum. Consequently all that has been cited as the Probans is Inconclusive; because their presence in the contrary of the Probandum is open to suspicion.
Then again, what is asserted goes against the doctrine that restricts the number of the Forms of Cognition to four ; as in the way shown, the existence of other forms of cognition also might be proved. For instance, it can be said that - Perception has for its companion a Form of Cognition other than Inference, Analogical Cognition and Verbal Cognition-because it is a form of Cognition,-like Inference'.
Further Cognisable Things have been held to fall under thres classesviz. : Universal, Particular and Particular-Universal. This also would be contravened ; as in the same way the existence of other Cognisable Things also may be proved.
Whatever answer you may have to these criticisms will serve my purpose also; so enough of this.-(1584-1586)