Indian Logic Part 02

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 29

18
INDIAN LOGIC
too.39 It is difficult to see the precise point of the Buddhist's argument; for after all he does distinguish between pleasure etc. on the one hand and cognition on the other. As a matter of fact, one of his most crucial consideration is that it is impossible for cognition to arise and not be perceived just as it is impossible for pleasure etc. to arise and not be perceived. However, the Buddhist's insistence on the point is so emphatic and Jayanta cannot be accused of misunderstanding him in this respect at least. In any case, Jayanta counters the Buddhist by submitting that pleasure etc. cannot be of the nature of cognition because the former are directly perceived as being of the form of enjoyment etc., the latter as being of the form of apprehension of an object. The Buddhist pleads that cognition itself appears in the form of subspecies like pleasure, pain etc. ; Jayanta retorts that cognition is and pleasure etc. are not of the form of apprehension of an object." The Buddhist argues that pleasure, pain, etc. are subspecies of cognition just as doubtful cognition, erroneous cognition etc. are; Jayanta retorts : "Doubtful cognition, erroneous cognition, etc. are certainly, subspecies of cognition because they are so many sorts of apprehension of an object; on the other hand, pleasure, pain, etc. are not at all of the form of apprehension of an object. As a matter of fact, pleasure etc. are certain internal qualities which are exclusively an object of cognition just as a jar is exclusively an object of cognition, neither being of the nature of cognition in the manner doubtful cognition, erroneous cognition, etc. are."'+2 The Buddhist argues that pleasure, etc. are not exclusively an object of cognition because being self-revelatory they grasp themselves by themselves and whatever grasps itself by itself is of the nature of cognition; Jayanta retorts : "So far as the character of being self-revelatory is concerned it is not exhibited even by a cognition, to say nothing of pleasure etc.; but in any case, nobody experiences a pleasure as something that grasps an object in the manner a cognition grasps an object.''+3 The Buddhist argues that if pleasure etc. are not something self-revelatory then it should be immaterial whether they are born or not, so that one must either always experience them or never ; Jayanta retorts : “It is the very nature of pleasure etc. that as soon as they are born a cognition arises to grasp them. Rather, if they are something self-revelatory then one man's pleasure, etc. should be experienced by everybody, just as a lamp which is something self-revelatory reveals itself to everybody."'++ Here Jayanta elaborately reiterates his earlier point that in cognition of pleasure pleasure plays