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NATURE OF VERBAL TESTIMONY
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sentence as also in the case of perceptual cognition the real problem was not to deny the presence of an inferential factor operative there but to precisely define the nature of this inferential factor, a task which proved beyond the competence of our logicians largely because they had conceived in a rather narrow fashion what inference consists in. The following, for example, is how the process of understanding the meaning of a sentence could be shown to involve an inferential factor : "When the words x, y, z are joined according to this rule of syntax the sentence means that the things denoted by x, y, z stand related in this manner, and the words x, y, z denote these and these things.”
Having completed the above refutation Jayanta undertakes a refutation of the Buddhist view that a word has nothing to do with things real. Really, the Buddhist has a theory according to which perception understood as bare sensory experience is what alone grasps things real; and in line with this theory he declares that no thought whatsoever-neither post-perceptual thought, nor an ordinary inference, nor an understanding of the meaning-of-a-sentence -- has anything to do with things real. Hence his view is presently refuted by Jayanta. Thus the Buddhist argues : “The words of a sentence do not acquaint one with things real; having little to do with things real they are a product of mere thought. And what they do is to naturally generate certain thought type of cognitions irrespective of how real things behave. For example, the sentence 'a hundred hordes of elephants are seated on the finger-tip' has nothing to do with things real."23 Jayanta pleads : “That way even eye, etc. often produce a false cognition, but from this you do not conclude that eye, etc. have nothing to do with things real"; the Buddhist retorts : "Eye, etc. are not in themselves an instrument of false cognition, they become so in case they are defective."24 Jayanta pleads : “Even words produce a false cognition only in case they are uttered by a faulty person;" the Buddhist retorts : "Even a faulty person produces no false cognition if he just keeps silent while a sentence like 'a hundred hordes etc.' will produce a false cognition even when uttered by a faultless person. Morever, eye etc. cease to perceive the wrong way as soon as the falsity of the cognition concerned is realized, but a sentence like 'a hundred hordes etc. will produce a false cognition even when listened for the hundredth time."25 Jayanta pleads : "Your conclusion follows if words were never to produce a true cognition. But as a matter of fact, when a faultless person says there are fruits on the river-bank'
