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VALIDITY - EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC
not-x is cognized here and now again virtually amounts to accepting the second, theory. Then criticism is directed against the second alternative according to which a false cognition cognizes
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x which has concealed its own form and assumed the form of a not-x. There it is asked as to what is revealed in this cognition -x or not-x; if x then this is no false cognition, if not-x then there is no use saying that this not-x is in fact x.87 The suggestion that the subsequently arising cognition which concels this cognition proves that this not-x is in fact x is rejected on the ground that this later cognition might well prove that a not-x did not exist there when that earlier cognition took place but it cannot prove that a not-x was not revealed in that earlier cognition, also on the ground that on this logic one cannot point out the object of a false cognition which happens not to be cancelled by a later cognition. Lastly is criticized the third alternative according to which a false cognition cognizes x but what is reflected in it is a not-x. Thus it is argued that a cognition cognizes what is reflected in it and not what just happens to be nearby when this cognition takes place, so that if a not-x is reflected in a cognition a not-x it is that this cognition cognizes even if x happens to be nearby at the time. Thus on the Prabhakarite's showing, since the first theory maintains that a false cognition cognizes a nonexistent not-x where x in fact exists it is no better than the second. theory.90
Then is criticized the second theory according to which a false cognition cognizes as something what is in fact nothing. The opponent is asked as to whether a false cognition cognizes something that does not exist at all or something that exists elsewhere; in the latter case his theory becomes one with the first theory, in the former case it is palpably untenable inasmuch as one cannot cognize a thing like skylotus that does not exist at all." The suggestion that a past 'impression' might make possible the cognition of an utterly non-existent thing is rejected on the ground that an 'impression' itself is always generated by a cognition that has got something existent for its object." And granting that a past impression might make possible the cognition of an utterly non-existent thing it is argued that in that case one must sometimes have a false cognition of sky-lotus just as one sometimes has a false cognition of silver."
Lastly is criticized the third theory according to which a false cognition cognizes as an external object what is in fact a mental state.
