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can be found out why one is made manifest on one occasion; the former's submission is that no such reason can be actually found out.?? In this connection rejected as sophistical is the Mīmāṁsaka's submission that this is like all smell existing in earth and yet one smell being made manifest this way another that way; Jayanta's point is that one and the same smell does not exist everywhere on earth and so is not analogous to the Mīmāmsaka's allegedly ubiquitous word.78 - Jayanta points out that the same place where one word is pronounced now another can be pronounced on another occasion, a situation understandable only in case the two words are produced on the two occasions; certainly, we do not find the same smell to exist in this flower now in that on another occasion (perhaps, it would have been better if it was said that we do not find one smell to exist in a flower now another on another occasion).79 The suggestion that some 'unseen? factor might account for the situation is rejected on the ground that the rival hypothesis requires no such factor.80 Then Jayanta argues that if the features like loudness etc. belong not to a word itself but to the sound which manifests this.word, then these features should not be cognised through an ear, for on the Mīmāmsaka's showing sound is of the form of air while air cannot be cognised through an ear.81 The suggestion that this is like the properties belonging to a relevant particular being cognised as belonging to the 'universal concerned is rejected on the ground that a relevant particular and the 'universal' concerned are both cognised through the same sense-organ but not a word and air.82 In this connection Jayanta particularly ridicules the Mīmārsaka's account of what is heard when a conch-shell is blown. For according to the Mīmāṁsaka, whatever is heard is heard as a result of an air-mass making manifest an eternally existing word, but no word is heard when a conch-shell is blown; so he suggests that what is heard here is a word-not-of-the-form-of-a-letter. But then realising that the idea of such a word makes little sense he suggests that what is heard here is the universal 'word-ness'. Jayanta says that it is fantastic that a ‘universal' be cognised except as seated in a relevant particular; to this is added that the universal 'word-ness cannot reside in the concerned air-mass, also that here there are heard no letters while there can be nothing like a word-not-of-the-form-of-a-letter.83
Jayanta now recalls that the Mīmārnsaka has poked fun at the
