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158
INDIAN LOGIC
Jayanta's present Mīmāṁsaka opponent points out that letters do not exhibit a similarity of structure, and Jayanta tells him that that is the Sankhya way of speaking and also that a similarity of structure might be exhibited even by two such objects as bear no common name (e.g. by a cow and a gavaya in whose case there arises no question of one ‘universal' being shared in common). Then this opponent argues that letters are called by the name 'letter' simiply because they are all an object of auditory cognition, and Jayanta tells him that thąt is the Buddhist way of speaking—'to be an object of auditory cognition being the common function performed by all letters. But then Jayanta is left with no alternative but to say in a dogmatic fashion that a ‘universal' is posited to reside in several things when they happen to be called by the same name; however, since exceptions are allowed in this general rule his present Mimāṁsaka opponent would plead that no universal 'letter-ness' resides in letters even though they all happen to be called by the common name 'letter’, Jayanta would, of course, say that the present one is not an exceptional case, but the point is that there is no ligic behind the talk of the rule and an exception indulged in by him in this connection. Thus he here says : “A ‘universal' is to be posited in the case where a uniform cognition arises in an uncontradicted fashion;?? this is to say practically nothing. Logically, the question whether there does or does not exist a ‘universal corresponding to a class of things is the question whether or not these things can be defined in terms of some class-character or other, and this question has to be answered in the affirmative in the case of all class-of-things. To this extent Jayanta might be correct when be insists that there exists a 'universal corresponding to an individual letter as also to all the letters taken together. But in fact neither Jayanta nor his present Mīmāṁsaka opponent is interested in this logical aspect of the matter. For with both a 'universal' is an eternal ubiquitous independent real which exists in all the members of the concerned class-of-things and which is taken note of as soon as such a member is encountered; and certainly, a 'universal' as thus conceived can be said to be possessed neither by an individual letter nor by all the letters taken together. And when the present Mimāmsaka denies that there exists a 'universal corresponding to all the letters taken together his intention simply is to lend some extra plausibility
