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from an illusory one by pointing out that the former takes place in the presence of a corresponding physical object, the latter in the absence of any such object26; but later he argues that an alleged genuine sensory experience too takes place in the absence of any physical object, thus emphatically falling prey to illusory sensory experience27. All this makes it incumbent on a serious student to sharply distinguish Dharmakirti the logician from Dharmakirti the idealist. Tradition itself, Buddhist as well as Brahmanical, distinguishes between Dharmakīrti's theses developed from the standpoint of Sautrāntika realism and those developed from the standpoint of Yogācāra idealism, and broadly speaking it is the former that characterises Dharmakirti the logician, the latter Dharmakirti the idealist. Indeed, almost all characteristic theses developed by Dharmakirti in the field of logic have to be understood exclusively from the standpoint of realism. There is perhaps only one thesis that constitutes an exception in this connection, for in its case Dharmakīrti has thought it proper to formulate an idealist version along with the realist one. This is his thesis on pramānaphalabhāva i.e. on what constitutes a means of valid cognition and what constitutes its result. It is of a highly technical character but deserves notice because of its availability in two versions. Thus, adopting the realist standpoint. Dharmakirti argues that since a piece of valid cognition manages to apprehend its object because it bears the form of this object, here the means of valid cognition is 'this piece of cognition bearing the same form as its object (arthasārūpya)', and the result produced is, “this piece of cognition apprehending its object (arthādhigati)'28. But from the idealist standpoint there exist no objects independent of cognition, while it is owing to the agency of nescience that a piece of cognition gets split into something-that-is-grasped (grāhya) and something-that-grasps (grāhaka); so that what this piece of cognition apprehends is nothing but itself. Hence, adopting this standpoint, Dharmakīrti maintains that in the case of a piece of cognition the means of valid cognition is 'this piece of cognition assuming the form of something-that-grasps (grāhakabhāva)', and the result produced is this piece of cognition apprehending itself (svasamvedana)'9. the object of valid cognition being this piece of cognition assuming the form of something-that-is-grasped (grāhyabhāva).' For the rest, in the manner already hinted, Dharmakīrti the idealist simply seeks to puncture what Dharmakirti the logician so strenuously seeks to establish. It is difficult to fathom the precise intentions that lay behind Dharmakīrti's adopting
