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ETERNITY OR OTHERWISE OF A WORD
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universal 'cowness' common to all cows.'68 In this connection Jayanta considers an objection which is not much important in itself but has the merit of provoking him to make significant observations. Thus the opponent argues : “Leave aside the case of an individual letter; there is no universal 'letter-ness' common to all letters even. For a ‘universal' is posited in those cases where the observation of one relevant particular brings to mind another relevant particular; e.g. the observation of one particular cow brings to mind another paricular cow. But the observation of one letter (say, 'g') does not bring to mind another letter (say, 'v')69. As for the feeling that all letters are of the form of a letter, that is there because all letters are an object of auditory cognition."70 Jayanta retorts: "For the purpose of positing a 'universal it is an immaterial consideration whether the observation of one relevant particular does or does not bring to mind another relevant particular. Certainly, that often happens even when a ‘universal' is not to be posited, and that often does not happen even when a ‘universal' is to be posited. For the observation of x brings y to mind when x and y are somehow similar, like two cows, like a cow and a gavaya; on the other hand, no such similarity obtains between one letter and another. But to identify a 'universal' with the similarity concerned is a Sankhya position, not a Nyāya-Mimāṁsā position. Similarly to say that all letters are called a letter because all are an object of auditory cognition is like the Buddhist saying that a common name is applied to two things not because a common 'universal' resides in both but simply because the two happen to perform the same function. 7! Really, crucial to the Nyāya-Mīmārnsă doctrine of a 'universal' is the understanding that a common 'universal' is to be posited as residing in several things only when they are called by the same name; (there are a few and relatively obscure exceptions to the rule that a common 'universal' is to be posited as residing in several things whenever they are called by the same name). But commonsense suggests that a common word is applied to several things when they all exhibit either some similarity of structure or some similarity of function; the former aspect of the matter finds recognition in the Sankhya identification of a 'universal' with the similatiry concerned, the latter in the Buddhist contention that a common name is applied to two things when they happen to perform the same function. Now
