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134
INDIAN LOGIC
x is present there, but since x is not cognized as x we say that x has concealed its own form; similarly, since x is cognized as a not-x we say that x has assumed the form of this not-x.126 This is what obviously takes place whenever x is misperceived to be a not-x.12
(iii) It cognizes x but what is reflected in it is a not-x: You say that such a thing too is impossible, but there is nothing impossible about it too. It cognizes x because- x is what is pointed out - not because x is what just happens to be present nearby; (and since x is cognized as a not-x we say that what is reflected in it is a not-x)."
Jayanta's defence is essentially valid but the Prabhakarite's criticism is very much misconceived; for the latter just refuses to see that there are cases of false cognition.
Lastly, Jayanta answers the objections raised by the Prabhakarite against the very possiblility. of one cognition being cancelled by another. In this connection the latter had considered so many alternative meanings possibly attributed to the word 'cancellation', but Jayanta refuses to take notice of them all except one. 129 Thus on Jayanta's showing when the cognition Cs is cancelled by the later arisen cognition Cn the latter takes away what happens to be the former's object where 'taking away' does not mean the undoing of the fact that the former cognition had cognized its object, but the establishment of the fact that this object is something non-existent; again, what is established is not the fact that this object does not exist at the time when Cn occurs but that it did not exist at the time when Cs occurred moreover, this non-existence then was such that it ruled out the possibility of a simultaneous existence as well. The suggestion that a present cognition cannot establish a past nonexistence is dismissed as obviously untenable - a further criticism of it promised while refuting momentarism." The suggestion that an earlier cognition since it is something already well-established cannot be cancelled by a later coming new cognition is dismissed on the ground that the later cognition is in a better position to take note of the situation concerned. In all this again Jayanta is making an essentially valid defence while the Prabhakarite's original criticism is very much misconceived. For the simple fact is that there are cases. of one cognition cancelling another.
