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INDIAN LOGIC
pakşa. But this fear is groundless, for what is defiinitely known to be vipaksa can never be made a part and parcel of the paksa. For example, while invalidly inferring 'Brahminhood' from ‘manhood' or being eternal' from being cognisable' one cannot turn a definitely known vipaksa into paksa."3+ The atheist pleads: "Even if self-grown grass etc. are made into paksa they do not cease to be vipaksa; for nothing is pakşa by nature, so that everything must be either sapaksa or vipaksa”; Jayanta retorts : "True, nothing is paksa by nature; but for the duration of an inference something is to be treated as paksa and that cannot be counted among vipaksas." The atheist pleads : “But self-grown grass etc. are suspected to be a vipaksa, and a probans must not reside in what is suspected to be a vipaksa”; - Jayanta retorts: “On this logic, at the time of inferring in a mountain fire from smoke the mountain too is suspected to be a vipaksa"36. The opponent pleads: "One might be in doubt whether the paksa possesses probandum or does not, but the concerned invariable concomitance has been established on the basis of observing other cases"; Jayanta retorts: “That is true of our inference as well."37 The atheist pleads : “But an invariable concomitance must cover all possible cases while yours does not cover mountains, trees etc."; Jayanta retorts : “An invariable concomitance is not established on the basis of a caseby-case enumeration. Moreover, on this logic you cannot infer: 'A sense-perception must require a sense-organ in the form of an instrument, because it is an activity, just like cutting-down-a-tree which is an activity requiring an axe in the form of an instrument. 138 The atheist has objected that God is not absolutely similar to the potter who is an illustrative instance in the theist's inference; Jayanta retorts : “In all inference probans and probandum always coexist but they coexist differently in different cases. For example, a sense-organ is not absolutely similar to an axe."39 The atheist pleads : "What an act requires is just an instrument, not an instrument of a particular type"; Jayanta retorts : "Similarly, an arrangement of parts requires just a voluntary producer, not a voluntary producer of a particular type. "40 To this is added that the details of God's nature can be gathered from scriptural texts or they can be surmised on the basis of the consideration that the voluntary producer responsible for the creation of earth etc. must be an extra-ordinary person of such and such a nature. All this constitutes Jayanta's logically most weighty
