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154
INDIAN LOGIC
same meaning whenever it is uttered; and in that case there will be no alternative to admitting your thesis that a letter is an eternal verity which is only made manifest whenever it is pronounced."SI Since neither Jayanta nor Mīmārsaka concede the possibility of accounting for an observed similarity without positing an appropriate eternal ubiquitous entity Jayanta's challenge makes sense; for he is only pleading that if an appropriate universal' can account for the similarity observed in other cases why not for that observed in two cases of pronouncing the same letter. Further elucidating his point Jayanta says : “When the same letter 'g' is pronounced on two occasions, are there then pronounced two 'g's or is there then made manifest twice the one letter 'g' ? The latter alternative should be rejected, for that way one can even maintain - as the grammarians actually do—that when the different letters 'y', 'r', 'T, ‘v etc. are pronounced there is then only made manifest so many times the one entity called 'word'.52 The Mīmāmsaka pleads : "The letters y, r, I, v etc. appear distinct from one another but not so the two pronunciations of the letter g"; Jayanta retorts: "Two pronunciations of the letter g might not appear distinct from one another, but they do appear different from one another."53 Jayanta's point is that the numerical difference between x and y can be noticed even while there is noticed no qualitative difference between the two. The Mimāmsaka pleads : “There can be no numerical difference without there also being a qualitative difference. For example, two'cows are numerically different precisely because they are also qualitatively different in so many ways; but two pronunciations of the same letter are qualitatively different in no way whatsoever."S+ Jayanta replies by making a distinction between 'qualitative difference being there' and 'qualitative difference being noticed there, and submits that there are cases when the numerical difference between x and y is noticed before there is noticed any qualitative difference between the two, it being not denied that a qualitative difference of some sort is actually present there; (Jayanta gives the example of a heap of grains where the individual grains are noticed to be numerically different without being noticed to be qualitatively different).55 When the Mimāmsaka insists on his point Jayanta gives the example of an act of motion which is seen to be different every moment without any particular difference
