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142
INDIAN LOGIC
that case r is something invisible by nature. Moreover, all ū is my paksa, so that it is yet undecided whether ū pointed out by you exhibits ror does not." The opponent says: “But all things lacking probandum (i.e. lacking r) you have converted into your pakşa'; Jayanta retorts : "I have done nothing of the sort. Moreover, in a really invalid inference it is impossible to convert into paksa all things lacking probandum.” This retort is crucial as well as invalid. For as already shown, Jayanta has really converted into pakșa all things lacking probandum; so his present retort amounts to saying: "I have so cleverly chosen my paksa and probandum that nothing can act as a vipaksa (let us ignore Jayanta's 'non-produced things'). All those offering an invalid inference are not so clever.” The opponent says : “But an invariable concomitance between x and r must cover all relevant cases while in your inference it does not cover such and such a ū"; Jayanta retorts : “Well, all ū is my pakşa, so that an invariable concomitance between x and r must be established ignoring all, ū; and that is what the inference does alright.” This retort is, again, crucial as well as invalid. Really, to establish an invariable concomitance between x and r means to show that ris present wherever x is present while x is absent wherever r is absent; but things where r is absent are all ū (here too let us ignore Jayanta's 'non-produced things'), so that the invariable concomitance in question cannot be established ignoring all ū. Hence Jayanta's present retort amounts to saying: “I have so cleverly chosen my paksa and probandum that any feature belonging to both u and ū will act as a valid probans for inferring my probandum." (Jayanta's last argument is based not on a formal consideration but on a material one. For he submits that the procedure adopted by him while inferring God as a voluntary producer in the case of the causation of earth etc. is essentially the same as adopted even by the opponent while inferring a sense-organ as an instrument in the case of the causation of sense-perception. The only difficulty is that the causation of sense-perception is admittedly a voluntary act and so the idea of it requiring an instrumental cause sounds tenable, but the causation of earth etc. is not admittedly a voluntary act and so the idea of it requiring a voluntary producer requires demonstration, That, however, is no reason why Jayanta's demonstration of God's existence should be dismissed off-hand. But as things stand, this demonstration is considerably fallacious]
