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INDIAN LOGIC
of there being noticed in x certain features which it shares with this not-x."'\17 The Prabhakarite could argue back with some plausibility : "Since true perception involves no element of memory, a cognitive operation that involves an element of memory is no sort of perception.” As a matter of fact, even a true perception is not caused by a sense-organ alone but by it as assisted by a relevant memory; . on the other hand, even a non-defective sense-organ might produce a false perception in case there has been made no proper use of a relevant memory. So what is essential to all perception is the memorybased identification of sense-contacted object; in the case of true perception this identification is correct, in the case of false perception it is incorrect. And it is a relatively minor matter that in the case of a false perception the sense-organ is often defective. But since Jayanta virtually treats a non-defective sense-organ as the sole cause of true perception he is bound to speak as if a false perception must be produced by a defective sense-organ; on the other hand, in the case of a false perception he assigns a fole to memory because that seems unavoidable, but in the case of true perception he does nothing of the sort. Little wonder, citing an illustration the Prabhakarite aruges : "A defective paddy-seed certainly fails to produce a paddy-plant but that does not mean that it will produce a barley-plant;" and citing a counterillustration Jayanta retorts: “A defective paddy-seed might not produce a paddy-plant but it will certainly produce a cake though not much tasty."118 Clearly, the Prabhākarite demands a closer similarity between a true perception and a false perception than Jayanta is ready to concede; and the remedy lies in properly correcting the faulty view of true perception that is common to both the Prabhākarite and Jayanta.
Then Jayanta criticizes the Prabhakarite understanding of a case of false cognition like dream, seeing of two moons, finding sugar bitter in taste, etc. Thus the Prabhākarite says that in dream there takes place a memory which is not recognized as a memory; Jayanta retorts: “Even such things are seen in dream as were never experienced earlier; so how can that be a case of memory ?"119 Similarly, the Prabhākarite says that an eye that sees two moons becomes so defective that instead of seeing oneness belonging to the moon it sees twoness belonging to its own emanation'; Jayanta retorts: "An eye's ‘emanation' is something inherently imperceptible and so the explanation offered is no proper explanation. Moreover, do you mean
