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INDIAN LOGIC
self-cognitive cognition has been adopted by the Prabhakarite in imitation of the Buddhist but without any intention of drawing from it so many far-reaching conclusions in the manner of the Buddhist; even so, Jayanta's point has its own weight. Then coming to the main point Jayanta asks the Prabhakarite that if perception of x has really taken place, then where is the occasion for a memory of a not-x and that even if for some reason such a memory takes place where is the occasion for saying about x that it is a not-x." The Prabhakarite pleads that here perception of x takes place in the form of 'perception of a something not in the form of 'perception of x as possessed of its characteristic features'; Jayanta retorts: "This means that here there are first noticed features common to x and a not-x, then the not-x is recalled, and lastly there results a false cognition to the effect 'the before-lying object is a not-x'. Apparently, this cognition is a unitary cognition. And it is of the form of a perception because while acting on its basis one acts under the impression that one has perceived.a not-x." The Prabhakarite pleads: "One here acts as a result of having failed to distinguish between the memory concerned and the fresh cognition concerned"; Jayanta taunts: "This idea you have stolen from the house of Dharmakirti who says that one acts as a result of having identified the thing perceived with the thing thought. But this theft would serve no purpose. For one might ask Dharmakirti as to how one can act unless one realizes that one has cognized the perceived object, and one might ask you as to how one can'act unless one realizes that one has cognized a before-lying not-x. So what here takes place is 'perception of a not-x' not just 'memory of a not-x". Jayanta's reference to Dharmakirti is somewhat pertinent, for as in several other cases here too the Prabhakarite has worked under the shadow of a corresponding Buddhist speculation. The Buddhist draws a sharp. distinction between things perceived and things thought and then contends that ordinary people act as if there exists no such distinction; the Prabhakarite contends that in an alleged case of false perception there is a distinction between the thing perceived and the thing recalled even if the person concerned acts as if there exists no such distinction. For the rest, the two lines of thought have been pursued in two very different contexts and with a view to serving two very different purposes. In any case, the Prabhakarite pleads: "But while explaining what you call 'perception of x as not-x' you too assign a role to memory"; Jayanta retorts: "Yes, here there does take place a memory
