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VALIDITY - EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC
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why both are to be called “perception even if the former 'true perception the latter 'false perception'. Thus when in the object x there are observed certain features which are characteristic of x and x alone and on the basis of this observation this object is identified as x we have a case of “perception of x as x (= true perception of x)'; on the other hand, when in the object x there are observed certain features which are characteristic not only of x but also of a not-x and on the basis of this observation this object is identified as this not-x we have a case of 'perception of x as a notx (=false perception of x = false perception of a not-x)'. The fact that the Naiyāyika and the Kumārilite gave due importance to the role of memory while explaining a case of false perception but not while explaining a case of true perception emboldened the Prabhakarite to contend that an alleged case of false perception is not at all a case of perception but a case of a perception and a memory not distinguished from one another.' Be that as it may, let us see how Jayanta meets the Prabhākarite's challenge.
Jayanta begins by arguing that perception of x as x' and 'perception of x as not-x' both are a unitary cognition and both are of the form of a perceptiort, thus taking exception to the Prabhakarite's contention that 'perception of x as not-x' is an amalgam of a perception of x and a memory of not-x where the memory fails to be recognized as a memory; Jayanta's point is that even in this case immediate introspection reveals that what is being experienced is a unitary. cognition of the form of perception, this cognition being a cognition to the effect 'the before-lying object which exhibits such and such features is not-x'.'11 Jayanta thus evinces clear enough realization as to where lies the crux of the problem - that is, in admitting that true perception and false perception are an essentially similar sort of cognitive operations; (the only pity is that his own account of perception does not clearly bring out that “perception of x as x' is a cognition to the effect 'the before-lying object which exhibits such and such features is x', for in that connection his emphasis would be on the idea that here the word concerned is recalled and the ‘universal' concerned is noticed). However, before developing his argument based on this consideration Jayanta thinks it profitable to remind the Prabhakarite that on the latter's showing all cognition is necessarily self-cognition, so that it should be impossible for a memory not to be recognized as a memory. 112 Really, the thesis of
