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VALIDITY – EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC
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object is x. So what happens is that x is freshly cognized and a notx is recalled while there is not apprehended the distinction obtaining between this fresh cognition and this memory."101 The opponent pleads : "To say that the distinction in question is not apprehended is to say that x is cognized as not-x” 102 The Prabhākarite replies : "To admit that would amount to accepting the first theory. So let us only admit that here the distinction is not realized that x is something freshly cognized, not-x something just recalled. That is why mistaken are those of our own colleagues who submit that here there ultimately takes place a single consideration to the effect 'this thing is a notx'; for to submit that would amount to accepting the first theory."103 The opponent asks : “But then how to explain the fact that a subsequent cognition of x as x cancels the earlier cognition of x and a not-x ?"104 The Prabhakarite replies: "There takes place no cancellation that way. What happens is that the distinction which was earlier not apprehended is apprehended subsequently and one says : 'So this thing is not a notx. This thing is this thing, a not-x is a not-x . "105 Lastly, the opponent asks : “But how will that sort of explanation apply to a case like dreamcognition ?”106 The Prabhākarite replies : "In dream there just takes place a memory which is not apprehended as a memory. Certainly, an appropriate cause can generate memory during sleep too."107 The opponent objects : "But even this sort of explanation will not apply to the cases of there being seen two moons, sugar tasting bitter, etc. etc."108 The Prabhākarite replies : "Even in such cases what happens is that owing to some reason or other there fails to take place the usually expected cognition. Thus an eye might become defective so that instead of seeing oneness belonging to the moon it sees twoness belonging to its own 'emanation', a tongue might become so defective that instead of tasting sweetness belonging to sugar it tastes bitterness belonging to the bile present in this tongue itself."109 This whole enquiry the Prabhakarite concludes by arguing that since there thus exists nothing like a false cognition all cognition is intrinsically valid, so that the cognition generated by a Vedic sentence too is intrinsically valid 110 This Prabhakarite version of the thesis that all cognition is intrinsically valid is as much bewildering as was its Kumārilite version. That both versions are theologically motivated goes without saying, the thesis itself being so motivated. But the way empirical evidence is adduced by way of vindicating the two versions is noteworthy. For the present we confine our attention to the
