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VALIDITY
EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC
of the specific features of a not-x, just as when one is in doubt whether the before-lying object is x or a not-x there take place a memory of the specific features of x and a memory of the specific features of a not-x. That is why this mis-perception or this doubt fails to arise. in one who has no prior cognition of the not-x concerned. However, it is not enough to say that a memory takes place in all case of misperception (or doubt); for what is necessary is to show how this memory gives rise to a unitary cognition of the form of misperception (or doubt)", Jayanta's point is almost all valid; but he has to realize that the sort of explanation he is here offering for the cases of misperception and doubt should have been offered also for the cases. of true perception. For 'true perception of x takes place when there are observed in a before-lying object features exclusive to x and on the basis of this observation this object is identified as x, 'perception of x as a not-x' when there are observed in a before-lying object features common to x and a not-x and on the basis of this observation this object is wrongly identified as a not-x (in this case even if the object is identified as x, that will be a case of 'true perception of x' by accident), 'doubtful perception of either x or a not-x' when there are observed in a before-lying object features common to x and a notx but on the basis of this observation this object is not identified either as x or as a not-x while leaving both possibilities open. Had Jayanta put matters in this way he could convincingly say to the Prabhakarite
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"The mere occurrence of a memory does not convert a case of misperception into a case of memory just as it does not convert a case of true perception into a case of memory"; but as things stood, both Jayanta and the Prabhakarite shared a view of true perception that underplayed the role of memory. This becomes further evident from Jayanta's consideration of another objection raised by the Prabhakarite. Thus the latter argues: "The causal aggregate which, when free from defect, produces a true perception will fail to produce it in case it happens to suffer from a defect. But there is no sense in saying that in the latter case there is produced a false perception"; this argument clearly presupposes that a sense-organ produces true perception without the involvement of an element of memory but this presupposition is shared by Jayanta himself and so he has to reply by saying "A defective sense-organ, even while coming in contact with x, produces false perception of a not-x when assisted by the memory of this not-x, which memory in turn takes place on account
