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INDIAN LOGIC
constitutes false cognition, as also what he has to say about his own positive theory according to which an alleged case of false cognition is a case of not apprehending the distinction between a fresh cognition and a memory. But before presenting the details of his theory the Prabhākarite subjects to some further criticism the rival theories, this time using a technical terminology that was then current. Thus according to one theory a false cognition cognizes as one thing what is in fact another thing, according to another it cognizes as something what is in fact nothing, according to a third it cognizes as an external object what is in fact a mental state. In technical language the first was called viparitakhyāti (= apprehension of something different), the second asatkhyāti (= apprehension of something nonexistent), the third ātmakhyāti (= apprehension of something mental); and to them was to be added the Prabhākarite's own theory called akhyāti (= nonapprehension).81 The first theory was advocated by the Naiyāyika while the other two came from the illusonist-idealist circles. The Prabhakarite here criticises the first theory and then adds that the other two are also not satisfactory, he having a theory of his own; Jayanta, on his part, will answer the criticism thus levelled against the first theory.
His criticism of the first theory according to which a false cognition cognizes x as not-x, the Prabhākarite begins by referring to the already made point that nothing conceivably can produce a false cognition.82 Then he considers three ways in which this theory can conceive false cognition understood as a cognition of x as not-x, viz. (i) it cognizes a not-x existing at another place and time, (ii) it cognizes x which has concealed its own form and assumed the form of a notx, (iii) it cognizes x but what is reflected in it is a not-x.83 The first alternative is dismissed on the ground that it virtually amounts to accepting the second theory according to which a false cognition cognizes something non-existent; for after all a not-x is something non-existent where it is cognized to exist.84 The plea that a not-x exists at another place and time is rejected on the ground that what matters is that a not-x does not exist where it is cognized to exist, also on the ground that difficulties arise whether it is admitted that the place and time in question are cognized or it is admitted that the new place and time are cognized.85 The plea that a not-x is recalled is rejected on the ground that in that case there is nothing false about this cognition, also on the ground that to admit that a recalled
