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VALIDITY - EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC
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invalid, but this is what turns out to be the central import of the Kumārilite thesis under examination. What can at the most be said is that a cognition is believed to be valid until proved to be invalid, but even that is not correct unconditionally, as is conceded by the Kumārilite himself when he admits the possibility of cases when a cognition is believed to be doubtful. But let us see how Jayanta argues against the Kumārilite.
Jayanta begins by drawing a distinction between the everyday objects cognized through perception, inference etc. and the supersensuous objects cognized through Vedic testimony. Apparently his point is a theological point. For he insists that a decision must be made as to what ensures the validity of Vedic testimony while one might well leave undecided the question as to what ensures the validity of a perceptual cognition or the like; and he informs us that he is going to demonstrate that the validity of Vedic testimony is ensured not automatically but because of its particular origin.34 However, Jayanta's present pose of modesty is deceptive inasmuch as he is now going to concentrate all attention on the question as to what ensures the validity of a perceptual cognition or the like, and this question he decides by way of refuting the Kumārilite contention that all cognition is intrinsically valid. Thus the Kumārilite has argued that the validity of a cognition is intrinsic because it cannot be extrinsic either in respect of causation or in respect of functioning or in respect of its own-cognition. Jayanta considers all the three aspects of this argument but before doing that he has undertaken an independent discussion that throws much-light on the third of these aspects which is the most important one. For he asks the Kumārilite as to whether according to the latter all cognition just is valid or all cognition is cognized to be valid; the first alternative is postponed for a subsequent consideration which takes the form of meeting the Kumārilite's objections following the latter's own order of succession, the second alternative is considered here and now.35 Now the Kumārilite has virtually argued (1) that all cognition is valid because all cognition is of the form of apprehension of an object and (2) that all cognition is valid because all cognition is in a position to impel one to undertake a practical activity without a moment's doubt; but he develops his case in such a manner that these arguments so crucial for the purpose are smuggled in rather than thrust to the forefront. Jayanta's present discussion has the merit of punching these two arguments in a most effective manner.
