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INDIAN-LOGIC
time this cognition is had there are noticed in it no features which should mark out a valid cognition from an invalid one.47 The Kumārilite feels otherwise and submits that there are certain features specific to valid cognition which are noticed as soon as it is born; Jayanta challenges him to point out a single such feature.As Jayanta in effect argues, such a feature cannot be 'lucidity', 'absence of a feeling of doubt', 'not encountering a contradiction', or being true of its object', for the first two might be present in all cognition whether valid or not while the last two are not noticed at the time when a cognition is born.49 To this is added that if there really were any features that are specific to valid cognition one should never act on the basis of an invalid cognition and find oneself deceived. This is how Jayanta argues that practical activity is well possible on the basis of a doubtful cognition. But he hastens to add : "Of course, we too do not advocate an all-out prevalence of doubt. For our only point is that it is impossible to cognize the validity of a cognition at the very time when it is born."52 Thus closes Jayanta's independent discussion of the Kumārilite thesis that all cognition is intrinsically valid; then comes a discussion of the same following the Kumārilite's own order of exposition.
Jayanta undertakes to refute the three aspects of the Kumārilite's contention that the validity of a cognition cannot be extrinsic; for the latter has argued that it cannot be extrinsic in respect of causation, in respect of functioning, in respect of own-cognition. Thus Jayanta argues that the validity of a cognition is extrinsic in respect of causation because the causal aggregate which produces a cognition produces a valid cognition when containing a 'merit', just as on the Kumärilite's own showing it produces an invalid cognition when containing a 'defect’53 The argument is of doubtful cogency because a 'merit' thus spoken of is really mythical, as the Kumārilite has pointed out for his own reasons. Really, both the Kumarilite and Jayanta are conceding that there are only two types of cases when a cognition is produced, both calling them the cases of valid cognition and the cases of invalid cognition and both maintaining that the latter type of cases presuppose the presence of a 'defect' in the concerned causal aggregate. But from the fact that there are no third type of cases when a cognition as such is produced, the Kumārilite draws the false conclusion that a cognition as such is a valid cognition. For a cognition as such 'thus spoken of is mythical. On the other hand,
