________________
VALIDITY - EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC
119
from the fact that in the cases of invalid cognition the concerned causal aggregate contains a 'defect' Jayanta drawn the false conclusion that in the cases of valid cognition the concerned causal aggregate contains a 'merit'. For a 'merit' as thus spoken of is mythical. As a matter of fact, the concerned causal aggregate produces valid cognition when it happens to be free from all defect, it produces invalid cognition when it happens to be suffering from a defect. Then Jayanta argues that the validity of a cognition is extrinsic in respect of functioning because each member of the concerned causal aggregate depends on every other member of this aggregate, he having conceded that this aggregate as a whole does not depend on anything else. 54 It is doubtful whether the Kumārilite had all this in mind when he spoke of the validity of a cognition being not extrinsic in respect of functioning. For his only point was that a cognition when once produced performs its proper function - viz, apprehension of the object concerned - without requiring anything else, a point Jayanta concedes without fearing any danger to his own position." In any case, the point is not important. Lastly Jayanta argues that the validity of a cognition is extrinsic in respect of its own-cognition because this validity is cognized through the instrumentality of another cognition arisen subsequently. This is the most important aspect of the problem and is developed in details, but thiş. aspect was already well covered by Jayanta's earlier independent discussion of the problem. So picking up his threads Jayanta now argues that if it is granted that the validity of a cognition is cognized not at all then there is no option to further granting that it is cognized through the instrumentality of another cognition arisen subsequently, his point being the old point that a cognition at the very time when it arises is not cognized to be valid.56 This time Jayanta explicitly contends that a cognition is cognized to be valid when it is found to give rise to successful practice.57 But then the Kumārilite has argued against a contention like that, and Jayanta proceeds to argue against his argument. First of all, a flimsy point is disposed of. Thus the Kumārilite says : “A cognition being something momentary it is already past when its validity is sought to be tested; so whose validity it is that is being tested ?"; Jayanta retorts: "That is childish talk. For the same thing can be said also about the testing of the invalidity of a cognition, a testing which you yourself consider possible."s8 Then begins a serious consideration of the difficulties urged by the Kumārilite. Thus the Kumārilite has argued that if one already
IL-9
