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112
INDIAN LOGIC
without requiring anything else. The point is not much important and has played no conspicuous role in the present controversy.
Lastly is considered dependence in respect of own-cognition and the most important observations are made in this connection. Here the question is whether the validity of a cognition is itself cognized through a subsequent cognition, and the Kumārilite contention is that it is not. For on his showing this subsequent cognition alleged to cognize the validity of a cognition could be one of the three things, viz. (1) the cognition of a 'merit' belonging to the concerned causal aggregate, (2) the cognition of an absence of contradiction, (3) the cognition of the form of confirmation. The first alternative is rejected on two grounds - viz. (1) there exists no “merit' thus spoken of, (2) even if a cognition is inferred to be possessed of a merit in case it is found to produce the proper apprehension of an object, such an inference will serve no purpose if the proper apprehension of an object has already taken place while to say that this inference itself produces this proper apprehension of an object will involve mutual dependence.16 The second alternative is rejected on the ground that a temporary absence of contradiction will serve no purpose while an all time absence of contradiction can be available only to an omniscient person. The third alternative is rejected on three grounds, viz. (1) If by cognition of the form of confirmation is understood a subsequent cognition of the original object itself, the new cognition will be in the same boat as the original cognition and so will not go to confirm it. (2) If by cognition of the form of confirmation is understood a subsequent cognition of another object, the new cognition will have nothing to do with the original cognition and so will not go to confirm it. (3) If by cognition of the form of confirmation is understood a subsequent cognition of practical success related to the object concerned then there will arise an infinite regress inasmuch as the latter cognition will need confirmation at the hands of a third cognition and so on and so forth, there being no reason why the second cognition should require no confirmation if the first does. Really, the third ground considered in connection with the third alternative is most important; for a cognition is in fact proved to be valid only in case the practical activity undertaken in relation to the object concerned is found to be successful. So the Kumārilite pays special attention to this ground. Thus he is ready to give thought to the suggestion that
