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INDIAN LOGIC
be a Kumarilite's contention that a cognition is not intrinsically valid. While dismissing the third alternative the second point is further buttressed by arguing that the invalidity of a cognition cannot be intrinsic because this invalidity is caused when a defect is present in the concerned causal aggregate and it is known when the cognition concerned is contradicted by a subsequent cognition; in this connection the above first point is expressly repudiated by promising that it will be later argued in details why the validity of a cognition cannot be extrinsic,' a repudiation further confirmed while dismissing the second alternative (which itself endorses the above second point)." Then begins a detailed repudiation of the first point, that is a detailed vindication of the thesis that the validity of a cognition is intrinsic. But before all that is examined let a brief review be made of what has already been said. Thus since the first three alternatives are rejected in the above manner, the fourth turns out to be the Kumarilite's own alternative. Then what is said by way of arguing that the validity of a cognition cannot be intrinsic is something that the Kumārilite is expected to argue against; for he has to show how one is deceived in practice in case the preceding cognition happens to be invalid, it being his contention that the validity of a cognition is intrinsic. However, some clue to the working of his mind is given by how he argues that the invalidity of a cognition cannot be intrinsic. Thus to him the very fact that one undertakes activity in the light of a cognition seems to suggest that the validity of a cognition is intrinsic, a surmise to be confirmed by his detailed agrumentation that is forthcoming. Then we already have some idea of what is here meant by the qualification 'extrinsic' as attributed to the validity or invalidity of a cognition. Then we have been told how the invalidity of a cognition is caused and how it is known; since this causation requires an additional factor in the form of defect the invalidity is extrinsic in one sense, since this knowledge requires the services of a subsequent cognition the invalidity is extrinsic in another sense. So the Kumarilite is expected to argue that since the causation of the validity of a cognition requires no additional factor this validity is intrinsic in one sense, since the knowledge of this validity requires no services of a subsequent cognition this validity is intrinsic in another sense, an expectation to be fulfilled by his detailed argumenation that is forthcoming. And now we can take up this argumentation itself with a view to evaluating its worth.
