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VALIDITY - EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC
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corollary to his general position that all cognition is intrinsically valid. So keeping all this in mind Jayanta says :"In connection with the question as to how verbal testimony is a pramāna, the Mīmāmsakas have raised the question as to whether the validity of a cognition is intrinsic or extrinsic. And this latter question is discussed by them not for its own sake but for the sake of throwing light on the former question.”30 Thus begins Jayanta's discussion of what really constitutes the second independent topic of Ahnika III, this Ahnika having four such topics in all and as follows:
(i) The Nature of Verbal Testimony (a topic already covered
in our examination) (ii) The Validity of Cognition - Intrinsic or Extrinsic (iii) The Existence of God (iv) The Eternity or Otherwise of a word So it is these last three topics that we now examine one by one.
(ü) The Validity of Cognition - Intrinsic or Extrinsic
The Mīmāṁsā thesis that all cognition is intrinsically valid is defended by the Kumārilite and the Prabhākarite in two very different ways; so Jayanta first presents and criticizes its Kumārilite version and then its Prabhakarite version. .
The Kumārilite begins by posing four alternatives in this connection, viz. (1) both the validity and invalidity of a cognition are intrinsic, (2) both are extrinsic, (3) the invalidity is intrinsic, the validity extrinsic, (4) the validity is intrinsic, the invalidity extrinsic.! The position that the validity of a cognition is intrinsic is rejected on the ground that in that case it should be impossible for one to be deceived in the activity one undertakes in the light of an invalid cognition, for in that case one should be automatically assured that the cognition in question is not valid; the position that the invalidity of a cognition is intrinsic is rejected on the ground that in that case it should be impossible for one to undertake an activity in the light of an invalid cognition, for in that case one should be automatically assured that the cognition in question is invalid. These two points are made by way of dismissing the first alternative. But then the natural conclusion ought to be that the second alternative is worthy of acceptance; and since this conclusion is not actually drawn while the second point is repeated while dismissing the third alternative, it is clear that the first point is here made inadvertantly. Certainly it cannot
