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108
INDIAN LOGIC
the cognition generated is a true cognition;" the Buddhist retorts by asking: “But what about the case when a faultless person utters a sentence like a hundred hordes etc. ?"; Jayanta snubs him: "A faultless person would not indulge in a frivolity like that."26 The Buddhist pleads : "Granted that a faultless person would not utter a frivolous sentence like that. Even then one would remain in doubt whether no false cognition is generated because the person concerned is faultless or because no words are uttered"; Jayantą retorts : "When a sentence like 'there are fruits etc.' is uttered by a faulty person, the people deceived thereby blame this person, not his words; when the same sentence is uttered by a faultless person, the people.correctly informed thereby praise this person, not his words. From this it follows that words are not in themselves a means of false cognition, what makes them such a means are the faults vitiating the speaker."27 The Buddhist pleads: "What words do, they do by themselves irrespective. of who utters them"; Jayanta retorts: "This means that when words produce a true cognition they do so by themselves, so that it is wrong for you to say that words are by nature a means of false cognition.28 As a matter of fact, words are by nature-neither a means of false cognition nor a means of true cognition, just as a lamp is by nature neither; the only difference between the two is that a lamp produces a cognition - false or true - by its sheer presence while words produce a cognition - false or true - only when understood."29 As can be seen, misguided by his pervert understanding that words have nothing to do with things real the Buddhist is bent upon proving that white is black. The endeavour is particularly tragic because he himself normally distinguish between a true sentence and a false one, it being his own famous argument that a sentence is proved to be true in case it is proved that the speaker concerned is an authoritative person. Jayanta, on the other hand, is straightaway endorsing the essentially sound position that a sentence is true in case uttered by an authoritative person, false otherwise. Here really closes the most important part of Jayanta's thesis on the question of verbal testimony. But at this stage he is reminded of a queer position adopted on this question by the Mīmāṁsaka. Thus the Mimāmsaka submits that a sentence is true not only in case it is uttred by an authoritative person but also in case it happens to be a sentence uttered by nobody, it being his belief that the Vedas have the unique distinction of being a text composed by no author. And this position maintained by the Mīmāṁsaka is a
