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NATURE OF VERBAL TESTIMONY
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central argument is that since a word enables one to cognize the thingmeant in virtue of one's earlier acquired knowledge of the concerned word-meaning relationship just as a probans enables one to cognize the probandum in virtue of one's earlier acquired knowledge of the concerned invariable concomitance, verbal testimony is a case of inference." And even granting that a word somehow yields meaning even without resorting to inference his firm contention is that the knowledge that what is thus meant is the case is a result of an inference where the authoritative character of the speaker concerned acts as probans. To this is added that as a general rule what is inferred from a word is the speaker's intention to convey the information concerned and not that this information is true. 15 While answering the Buddhist Jayanta first makes a distinction between a sentence and a single word and argues that since a sentence conveys a meaning even when heard for the first time the deriving of this meaning cannot be a case of inference; on the other hand, recalling the earlier acquired knowledge of the meaning had by an individual word cannot be a case of inference because the knowledge had through inference is always expressed in the form of a sentence rather than an individual word. The suggestion that in the case of an individual word what is inferred is the proposition "This word is possessed of the thing meant' is rejected on the ground that no conceivable sense can be attributed to the phrase 'a word being possessed of the thing meant' the three alternative senses considered and found wanting being 'a word physically possesses the thing meant', 'a word, possesses the capacity to inform about the thing meant', 'a word possesses information about the thing meant'." To this is added that one proceeds in one manner while inferring, in an altogether different manner while learning a word-meaning or putting to use one's knowledge of a word-meaning. The opponent argues : "While learning the meaning of a word a child does apply the joint method of concomitance-in-presence and concomitance-in-absence, a method characteristic of inference. Thus it learns this meaning through watching that its elders behave in one way when the word x is uttered and not the word y, in another way when the opposite happens. Jayanta largely concedes the point but insists that what the child thus learns is the conventional meaning of the word concerned and not any invariable concomitance.20 Then is answered the Buddhist's contention that a sentence conveys a true information only in virtue of an inference where the authoritative character of the speaker concerned
